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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Justification of the Study 
Water development and allocation have been among the most important 
problems Utah has had to face throughout the past 117 years of develop-
ment . When Utah's first white se ttlers, th e Mormon pioneers, enter ed 
Salt Lake Valley in July of 1847, little met their eyes to en tice their 
stay. The earth was so parched and dry that they were unable t o scratch 
the surface with their plows. Less than two hours after their arrival 
members of the party began digging ditches and building dams to irrigate 
l 
and soften the earth so they could begin plowing. 
With the coming of additional settlers it was necessary t o move to 
insure an adequate supply for domestic uses as well as water for irriga-
tion. Since the clear, mountain stream water was ideal for domestic 
use, steps were soon taken to divert water of l ower quality for irriga-
tion use. The Jordan and Salt Lake Canal was such a project to bring 
water from nearby Utah Lake. 2 
Additional settlers and the exhaustion of l oca l water supplies made 
it necessary to estab lish colonies awa y from the center of the new settle -
1H. H. Bancroft, History of Utah (San Francisco: The History Company, 
1889), p. 261. 
2Fisher Sanford Harris, 100 Years of Water Development, A report sub -
mitted to the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan Water District of 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake City, Utah, April, 1942, p. 5. 
ment. Exploring parties were sent in every direction to look for suit -
able l ocations. Water was always an important factor in selection of 
3 
a site for the new locations. 
Cooperation was a key word in the development of Utah. The Mormon 
people worked together to build homes, schools, and churches as well as 
ditches, reservoirs, and other needs of the community. The conditions 
prevalent in the early history of Utah made the Church organization all 
powerful. The secular as well as ecclesiastical affairs of t he people 
were administered by the Church, including problems arising over water 
use. Gradually even before many non-Mormons joined the settlements, 
organizations formally separable from the Church were es tablished to 
administer water problems. The development was accentuated, moreover, 
with the increased arrival of non-Mormons. 4 
The irrigation company was one of the first of these organizations. 
Gradually the towns and villages took steps to insure their right to an 
adequate quantity and quality of water. As demand for water increased, 
steps were taken to expand or conserve existing supplies, and deve lop 
additional sources of supply. In most cases some type of organization was 
establis hed to administer the allocation and distribution of these waters . 
This trend has continued throughout the history of Utah; as water 
supplies have increased, so have the institutions responsible for th e 
administration of this resourc e . Today there are a multiplicity of these 
3
wells A. Hutchins, Mutual Irrigation Companies in Utah, Utah Agri-
cultural Experiment Station Bulletin 199, May 1927, pp. 9-ll . 
4 
Ibid., p. 16. 
institutions which are invo lved e ither directly or indir ectly in the 
distribution and allocation o f wat e r. Thos e institutions which appear 
t o play an important role in Utah t oda y are: 
1. The structure of the water law 
2 . The Office of the State Engineer 
3. The Utah Water and Power Board 
4. The Water Pollution Control Board 
5. Metropolitan water districts 
6. Water conservancy districts 
7. Water conservation (irrigation) districts 
8. Mutual irrigation companies 
9. Municipal water departments 
This study wi ll be concerned primarily with an eva l uation of these 
institutions, the part they have played in the development of Utah ' s 
water policy, and the role they may be called upon to play in the future. 
Objectives of the Study 
The specific objectives of this study are: 
1. To identify the institutions involved in the al l ocation, and 
distribution of water within Utah, 5 and to describe the functions and 
responsibilities of each. 
2. To appraise and evaluate these institutions with respect to 
various aspects of flexibility and security: (1) the legal right to the 
5This study will be concerned only with state and local organiza-
tions. The federal agencies, while prominent in development and conser-
vation, have little authority in actual water transfers, the main interest 
of this paper. 
4 
use of water , both quanti t y and qualit y, (2) the ease or difficulty 
with which transfers of these rights between uses and users can be made, 
(3) the protection against loss of thi s water right due to lawful acts 
of others, and (4) incentive to invest in and develop th e wa t e r resource . 
An attempt will be mad e to answer one overlying and highly signifi-
cant question. Are the laws and institutions in operation today effec -
tively fu lling, from an economic point of view, 6 the needs of Utah ' s 
wa t er program? If not, what additions or dele ti ons from the present 
system would be ad vantageous? 
Method of Procedure 
Since this s tud y will attempt t o evaluate the institutions involved 
in water all oca tion, some norm for comparison and evaluation must be 
established. Anything l ess would merely be a di scrip tion of their func -
tions . Chapt er II will dea l with the development of criteria with whi ch 
to make this evaluation . A r ev iew of the lit e rature tre ating theor e ti -
cal considerations for wa ter distribution and all ocation will form the 
basis of these cr ite ria . 
Chapter Ill will contain a desc ription and evaluation of the insti-
tuti ons t o be considered. The information for this chapte r was obtained 
by a study of relavent publications such as the Re port of the State 
Engineer, the Utah Code Annotated, interviews with heads of these insti -
tutions, and other studies that have dealt more specifically with one 
or more of t he institutions under considera tion. 
6 
An economic point of view i s based primaril y on eff icienc y and 
will be discussed in the next section. 
Chapter IV will attempt to draw some conclus i ons about the overall 
efficiency of Utah's water institutions and wi ll, if necessary, make 
suggestions that wou ld improve the efficiency of the various institutions. 
CHAPTER II 
ECONOMIC CRITERIA 
Efficiency and Distribution Effects 
Why should a study of the laws and ins tituti ons dealing wi th wa t e r 
be undertaken by an economis t ? Surely this area rece i ves cons ider ab l e 
attention by legislators, lawyers, engineers, and various pub lic servant s . 
Each of these disciplines make con tributions , but this does not diminish 
the significance of laws and ins titut ions to the economist; they form 
a base for economi c decision and, in fact, cons titute part of the deci -
s i on making machinery it se l £. 1 
Almost all sciences can be catagor i zed as ei ther positive, a body 
of sys t ematized knowledge concerning "what is, " or normative, a body 
of systematized knowledge concerned with "what ought to be. "2 Some, 
by the nature of their conten t, are both positive and normative and 
economics is such a science. 
Positive economics is independent of any ethical or moral va lue 
judgments . It i s based primarily on generali zations that are deduced 
f r om theoretical propositions and then are t ested by observati on of 
economic phenomena in the real world. These generalizations are then 
1stephen C. Smith, "Legal and Ins titutional Contro l s in Water All oca-
tion," Journal of Farm Economi cs, XLII, No. 5 (December 1960), 1346. 
~ilton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: The Uni -
versity of Chicago Press, 1953 ), pp. 3-4 . 
used to make predictions about the consequences of some change in the 
real world circumstances. The worth of a principle is judged on the 
reliability and consi s t ency of its predictions. 3 
Economics becomes normative whenever economis ts s tray into t he area 
of "what ought to be;" i.e., are concerned with criteria and standards 
that are judged " good" or "bad." However undesirable it may be, most 
economic studies do contain some elements of normative science . 
Most of the principles associated with positive and normative econ-
omics can be handled as either efficiency or distribution effec t s. The 
efficiency effects deal with the size of the aggregate production whi l e 
the distribution effects are concerned with who gets what shar e. 4 
When any policy innovation or change wil l r esult in an increase in 
the national income or community income, we say t his is an increase in 
efficiency. Or when the net \Velfare of the society under consideration 
is increased, efficiency has increased . One of the values of our soc i ety 
seems to be that efficiency, per se , is desirable. 
It is easy to see that a policy which wou ld raise the income or we l-
fare of all people within the area of consideration would be highly de-
sirable. But many, and probably most, proposed policy changes are 
directed toward particular areas or sectors. Even those policies which 
might result in a net increase of community income or we l fare, are likely 
to be detrimental to some. This situation raises the prob lem of distri-
3Ibid. , p. 5. 
4Jack Hirshleifer, et al., Water Supply: Economics, Technology, 
and Policy (Chicago: The Univer sity of Chicago Press, 1960),p. 36. 
8 
bution, i .e. , is it desirable that the inte res ts of one group of peop l e 
be favored over another? 
Economics alone cannot give us answers to policy 
problems; it can show us how to attain effic ienc y and 
what the distributional consequences are of attaining 
eff iciency in alternative possible ways, but it does 
not tell us how to distribute the gain from increased 
eff iciency . 5 
This study will attempt to remain in the realm of positive economics, 
i. e., efficiency effects. Hopefully, as distributional questions arise, 
as they surely will, the only consideration given them wil l be to say 
something about the possible consequences of alternative policies. 
This is not to say that increased efficiency alone is sufficient 
justification for implementing particular policies at all times. If the 
distributional effects of a policy that would increase efficiency are 
extremely adverse to the well being of certain parts of society, parti -
cularly already disadvantaged groups, society itself must decide to 
rej ec t that proposed policy. Society will be better prepared to make 
this de cision, however, when it has some understanding of the possible 
a lternatives and consequences. 
Market Vs. Administrative Allocation 
Perhaps this is the best point to discuss a longstanding, economic 
debate about resource allocation. Broad l y speaking, there are two methods 
of resource allocation used in our society, i.e., the market and adminis-
trative or judicial decree. Both systems can be applied wi thout viola-
ting the criteria that will be developed for economic efficiency . How-
5 
Ibid., p. 5. 
each have their otvn advantages and disadvantages and, depending upon the 
situation, both can be used to achieve an efficient allocation of re-
sources . ~ 
Under a market system buyers and sel l ers of resources come together 
in the market place and make exchanges at agreed upon rates of exchange 
(prices) . Arguments that seem to favor a market allocation of resources 
are: 
1 . The market is quite effective in allocating most of our re-
sources, except where third party effects are significant . 
2. I t is nondiscreti onary and automatic and provides its own infer-
mation. 
3. The market price reflects resource values in various uses. 
4. Exchanges are always voluntary and compensation is always paid 
any loss of resources that might accompany the exchange . 
At the other pole is a system of centralized planning whereby 
allocation of the resource is effected by some authority--administrative 
or judicial . This system may be more efficient, and perhaps, the only 
alternative in situations where the market wi ll not function satis-
factorily, such as: 
1. In cases where the resource is f ugitive or commonly owned and 
where property rights or firm assets are impossible to define. 
2. Where third party effects are important and cannot get incor-
porated into market calculations. 
3. Where problems are so complex that some human judgement per-
forms better than an impersonal market. 
4 . Where income distribution problems are important and the market 
does not allocate income sat isfactorily to alleviate poverty and wi dely 
10 
distr i bute benefits . 
By the very nature of this sys t em , it is obvious that administra-
tive decree allows a much gr eat er chance fo r personal pre judice or moral 
c onviction t o e nter into the f inal decision. Therefore, the market 
allocation system will be accepted, for this study, as the most effi -
c i ent means of allocating resources, and th e criteria developed here -
after wi ll r ef l ect this attitude . However, when attemp ting to evaluate 
those institutions utilizing the administrative decree sys t em, r efer e nce 
wi ll be made t o this section and how we ll they seem to follow the cri -
t eri a developed in the next sec tion . 
Review of the Literature 
Recently there has been considerabl e economic literature written 
about the allocation and development of water r esources . Several of 
these articles , part icu larly those tr eating theoretical cri t eria, will 
be reviewed in an attempt to es t ab lish criteria wher eby the r e lave nt 
institutions in Utah can be evaluated. 
Eguimarginal value in use 
Hirshleifer, DeHaven , and Milliman, in a book dealing wi th the 
wa t er supply , are content t o allow the free marke t almos t complete r es -
ponsibility for allocating wa t er. To beg in the argument, they postulate 
a given quantity of wate r becomes availabl e without cos t, and the on l y 
problem i s to a llocate it between compe ting us es and user s . An e conomic 
concept which charac t e rizes an ef ficient al l oca tion unde r s uch circum-
11 
stances is "e quimarginal value in use." 6 Value in use is essential l y 
measured by the maximum amount of resources (dollars) which the consumer 
would be willing to pay for that unit, while margina l value in use is 
the value in use of the last unit consumed. 7 
The principle, then, is that the resource should 
be so allocated that all consumers or users derive 
equal value in use from the marginal unit consumed 
or used.B 
Achievement of such an equali t y would necessitate some system of 
shares, rights or other means of defining proprietorship which would 
allow the owners to sell, trade, or otherwise exchange water. 
The market, then, is one way of organizing to produce economic 
efficiency. Incentive to trade wil l continue until maximum efficiency 
is achieved. Why? As long as the marginal va lue of wa ter is greater 
to one user than another, the former will be willing to pay more for the 
l ast unit of water considered than it is worth to the latter, making it 
profitable for both to initiate a sale or exchange . Such bargaining and 
trading will continue until exchanges, profitable to all parties, cannot 
be achieved . 9 
6 
Ibid., p. 36. 
7 
Ibid., p. 37 
8 
I bid . 
9 Ibtd p. 38. 
12 
The Heady-Timmons position 
Heady and Timmons have attempted to develop an economic framework 
for planning and legislating efficient use of water resources. 10 Their 
main concern is to maximize economic welfare. Two major criteria neces-
sary to achieve this goal are: (1) the efficient allocation of wa t er 
between competing uses to max imize socia l product, and (2) the eq uitable 
disttibution of the product or income of this resource among the indivi-
duals within the sector. 11 As well as devising laws and physical means 
t o attain these conditions, the authors are concerned with two important 
side conditions: (a) the l ega l and physical means to allow reasonable 
certainty in the use of water and the distribution of its benefits, and 
(b) the possibility of gradual change to allow diversities between uses 
and users to meet the changing preferences of socie t y. 12 
To attain the first major condition, which is the main emphasi s of 
the paper, Heady and Timmons outline three necessary steps: (1) determine 
the supply of water, (2) determine alternative uses and production pos-
sibilities, and (3) apply a choice criterion or yardstick to determine 
whic h uses are most important and in line with the relative wants or 
desires of the consumer . 13 
10E. 0. Heady and John F. Timmons, "Economic Framework for Planning 
and Legislating Efficient Use of Water Resources," Iowa's Water Resources, 
ed. John F. Timmons, et al. (Ames , Iowa: Iowa State College Press, 1956), 
pp. 47-61. 
11Ibid., p. 51. 
12 
I bid . 
13 
Ibid., p. 52. 
13 
Following economic theory, the pricing mechanism is the choice 
criterion or yardstick whereby the consumer can demonstrate the r e lative 
importance he places on various produc t s in the market. Heady and Timmons 
point out the difficulty involved in placing a value on such intangible 
uses of water as recreation and floo d prevention. To overcome this prob-
lem a sys t em of priority use is s ugges t ed. Priority use impli es ranking 
the various uses t o which water can be applied in order of importanc e . 
Wa t er fo r domes tic consumption wo uld undoubt ed l y have highes t priorit y 
14 
but beyond that point, much more s tudy needs to be unde rtake n . 
Wantrup's economi c cri t eria conce pt s 
Criteria for evaluating wa t er resource al l ocation developed by 
Wantrup are concerned more with increasing national income than maximizing 
soc ial satisfac tion . 15 The concepts of security and flexib il ity of wat er 
rights are discussed a s the most significant conditions which facilitate 
or impede such an increase. 
To the economist security has t wo connotations : (l) protection 
against physical uncertainty, (e.g. , supp l y of the quantit y of water 
usab l e under the right and qual ity), and (2) protection against vari-
ability over time due to the lawful acts of others . 16 Phys i cal uncer -
ta i nty can be r educed s i gni f icantly by physical means such a s wate r 
s torage and pollution control . Of much more inter est, at l east in the 
14I bid., p. 56. 
15s. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup , ·~oncepts Used as Economic Criteria for a 
Sys tem of Water Right s, " Land Economics, XXXII, No . 4 (November, 1956) , 
295-312. 
16I bid., p. 297. 
14 
context of appraising inst itutions, i s the secur it y of wate r right s 
against t enur e uncertainty. There are three f actors present t o s ome 
degree in all systems of wa ter rights which affect security of t enure: 
(l) prescription, (2) di ffere ntiati on of preference classes bas ed on 
purpose of wa ter use, and (3) a restriction on wa ter rights t o yield 
t o fu ture demands of others. 17 
A sub-topic of sec urity of t enur e , protec tion of investment, i s 
f avored by Wantrup in cases where the water right is insecur e , such a s 
wa t e r held in r eserva tion by a municipality for fu ture use and being 
appropriated only t emporarily by another user. 18 This private use r will 
not inves t in the wate r r esource beyond the point warranted by the 
e xpec t e d income s tream unless he r ec e ives some guarantee of "adequate 
compensation11 for nonrecovery of investment plus a sufficient profit 
mar gin . When these conditions are not me t, considerable under utiliza-
tion of the r esource will persist . 
The cri t erion " f l exibility of water rights," focus es on those as-
pec t s of water rights which facilitate or obstruct changes over time in 
the allocation of water r esources be t ween uses and users. 19 Whe ther or 
no t water can move from a use of l ow productivity to one of higher pro-
ductivi t y is important. The transfer of water can be accomplished in 
several ways . Voluntary transfer through buying and selling in the 
market place is not uncommon . Involuntary transfers, such as presc rip -
17Ibid., p. 300. 
18Ibid., pp. 301-303. 
l9Ib id., p. 304 . 
15 
tion, abandonment and forfeiture, and condemnation are important parts 
of a system of wa t er rights. 
Thus Wantrup concludes that in the area of natural resources, and 
particularly water allocation, direction rather than exact destination 
is the important consideration. 
The emphasis of this approach is on minimum stan-
dards in resource use rather than on the optimum use; 
on establishing base levels rather than on l ocating 
peaks; on avoiding dead-end streets and on keeping 
direction rather than on computing the shortes t dis-
tance; on mobility and adaptability of productive fac -
tors rather than on the ir optimum combination; on 
reducing institutional obstac l es to water deve lopment 
rather than on maximum level development; and on pro-
visions in wa ter law that facili tate changes over time 
in water allocation rather than on an opt i mum water 
al locat ion at particular times and places.20 
Economic Criterian 
The criter ia whereby th e institutions involved in the di stribution 
and allocation of water in Ut ah wi ll be evaluated are: 
(l) Equimarginal value in use. Water should be so allocated that 
all users derive equal value in use from the marginal unit consumed 
or used. This concept implies a high degree of flexibility since it 
relies on a movement of water from uses of low productivity to those of 
higher productivity. 
(2) A system of vested rights or proprietorship which guarantees 
the owner final disposition of the prescribed water. It must also 
insure adequate compensation if the right is transferred invo luntarily , 
20
rbid., p. Jll. 
16 
such as condemnati on proceedings. Such a system would prov ide security 
against tenure uncertainty and insure investment t o the point warranted 
by the potential income s tream created by the wate r in us e . 
The fol l owing questions as sub-topics might be examined to evaluat e 
the ins titutions. 
l. What degree of proprietorship is granted with an appropriation? 
Can water rights be bought, sold, or rented freely? Can changes in use 
be made wi thout filing additional applications? Can changes be made 
wi thou t l osing priority? 
2. Is there a system of priority uses? Does it facilitate or hinde r 
c hanges in use and between users? I s the priority system flexible over 
time t o meet changing conditions? 
3. What l egal mechanisms exist within the institutions to insure 
trans ferability? 
4. Are water rights ind e pe ndent of property ownership? 
5. Does the l aw provid e for securit y of t e nure? 
6 . Is compensation guaranteed in cases of condemnation? I s the r e 
a f ixe d method for determining compensation? Is th is adequate t o insure 
inves tme nt? 
7. Is expensive litigation needed to maintain tenure? 
8. What protective measures are there to insure the quality of 
water? 
9. Do the pricing policies of distributing institutions attempt to 
recover the fu ll cost of supplying the water? Is this done on a marginal 
or even an average cost basis? 
17 
10. Is there incentive for developing new sources of suppl y? 
What has been the development process? 
These ques tions will be cons i de r ed, as they apply, in the fo llow-
i ng disc ussions of the various Utah ins titu tions. 
18 
CHAPTER III 
DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF INSTITUTIONS 
Water Law 
Riparian doctrine 
Water law is represen t ed throughout the United States by two major 
legal doctrines, riparian and appropriation. The riparian rights doc-
trine, inherited from English common law, holds that the owner of land 
which adjoins a stream or body of wa t er has rights t o the use of that 
water. The water is a s egment of his property e ndowment. The amount 
of water he may use and the purpose for which he may use it are not 
sub j ect to exact determination. However, the courts , which have general 
supervision of this doctrine, have favored the "reasonab le use 11 rule. 
Under this rule each riparian owner may use water to the extent of his 
domestic needs, and then, sub j ec t t o the domestic uses of other riparians, 
may use water for such other purposes and in such amounts as is reasonable 
in the light of all surrounding circumstances. 1 
The riparian doctrine was developed and has remained in use in 
areas of abundant or at l eas t ample water supply. But in the arid West 
water sources are not so abundant. There is often many miles between 
water sources. Also, the annual rainfall is considerably less. It was 
1clyde 0. Fisher, Jr., '~e s t ern Experience 
tion Proposals, 11 The Law of Water Allocation in 
ed. David Harber and Stephen Bergen (New York: 
October, 1956), pp . 66-67. 
and Eastern Appropria-
the Eastern United States, 
The Ronal Press Co., 
19 
readily ap paren t t o the earlier se ttlers in Utah that the ripa rian doc-
trine was no t adequate. They favored and adopted the appropriati on doc -
trine. 
Appr opriation doctrine 
Under the appropriation doctrine all water is property of the state. 
Right t o the us e of that water is granted by the state upon the request 
to apply previously unappropriated water to a beneficial us e , irrespec-
tive of the l ocation of use in relation to the source of water. Admin-
istered either by the courts or some o ther institution assigned that 
specif ic responsibilit y , this doctrine l ends itself more t o flexibi lit y 
since water can be us ed away f r om lands adjacent to the source. It places 
a premium on actual benef icial use of water because unused r i ght s ar e 
not al l owed t o persist. Security of t enur e seems greater under the ripar-
ian doctrine al though some have all e ged the priority given an appropria-
ted ri ght as s ur es greater security than the re asonabl e us e rul e . 
The appropriation doc trine , as it is applied in Utah, wil l be dis-
cussed in the fol l owing section in much more detail. 
Proprietorship of th e water right. An appropriated wa ter right gran ts 
the right to use a specific quantity of water, for a specific use, t o be 
taken at a specific point of dive rsion . The early settlers in Utah appro-
priated water for some intended use by merely placing a written c laim in 
3 
a can nailed t o a tree close to the diversion point. Gradually many 
2r bid., pp. 86-87. 
3
wayne D. Criddl e , Utah's Future Water Problems (Logan , Utah: The 
Utah State University Press, 1958), p. 6. 
20 
claims were filed in county offices. This procedure r esulted in over 
appropriation of most streams, emphasizing the need for a more reliable 
means of defining individua l wate r rights. 4 
On March 12, 1903, the first comprehensive water law for the state 
of Utah was passed. This law required all future appropriations of 
water to be filed and c l ear ed through the Office of the State Engineer. 
All persons having rights to the use of water at that time were awarded 
"diligence rights" to their water supply upon proof that the right was 
in existence prior to 1903. 5 
The 1903 law specified all water within the boundaries of the state 
to be the property of the public. 6 The desire to apply water to a bene -
ficial use gives anyone a potential claim upon the state's water r esources 
since beneficial use is declared to be a public use. 7 
Any qualified person or organ i za tion wishing to apply water to some 
bene ficial and useful purpose must make an application for such an appro-
priation to the State Engineer. 8 If it is determined , after initial 
inves tigations, 9 that th ere is unappropriated water at the source speci-
5 
Twenty-ninth Biennial Report of the State Engineer to the Governor 
of Utah: Biennium July 1, 1952 to June 30 , 1954 (Salt Lake City, Utah, 
1954), p . 19. 
6
utah Code Annotated, 1953, 73-1 -1. 
7Ibid., 73 -1-5. 
9The procedure followed by the State Engineer in perfecting a water 
right will be discussed in more detail in the next section of this chapter . 
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fied in the application, and the intended use is beneficial, the applica-
tion is approved. This approval is only a preliminary step . It me r e l y 
empowers the applicant with the authority to proceed and perfect the 
right. 10 
A valid appropriation is constituted by: (l) an intent to apply 
the water to some beneficial use , (2) diversion of that water f rom i t s 
natura l channel, and (3) the actual application of the resource to some 
useful industry. 11 To perfect a right the applicant must cons truct any 
works necessary to divert and convey water to the point of proposed use. 
The construction of these works and the application of water to a1 bene-
ficial use must be comp l eted within a time period specified by the State 
Engineer. 12 
After the applicant has completed construction and all other details 
necessary to perfect his right, he must furnish proof of such to the 
State Engineer, who, upon veritification of the claims, will issue a 
certificate of appropriation defining the quantity of water appropriated, 
the purpose for which the water is used, the time during which the water 
is to be used each year, the source from which the wa t er is diverted, 
and the date of the appropriation . 13 
10Littl e Cottonwood Water Co . v. Kimba ll, 76 U. 243, 289 P. 116. 
llSowards v. Meagher, 37 U. 212, 108 P . lll2. 
12 
Utah Code, 73-3-12. 
13Ibid., 73 - 3-1 7. Priority of rights will be discussed later in 
this sec tion~ 
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Once a water right has been ves t ed , that water ceases to be public 
water and is not subject to further appropriation, 14 with two exceptions: 
l. Abandonment. To constitute abandonment there must exist a t the 
same time both an intent i on to abandon and an actual failure t o use the 
appropriated water . If the right is unused for a period of five years 
and the appropriator fails to apply for an ex t ension of time within which 
he may resume us e of the water, the water reverts to the public and is 
again subject to appropriation. 15 
2. Eminent domain. This power is held in reserve by most govern-
mental institutions in the state. These institutions may instigate con-
demnation proceedings against any part or all of any water supply or 
property connected therewith whenever the acquisition of additional 
16 
water is necessary for the public good. 
In all cases where rights are taken by condemnation, compensation 
is guaranteed. A court, jury or re feree must ascertain and assess the 
condemned property with respect to : (l) the value of the property sought 
and all improvements thereon; (2) if the property sought is onl y part 
of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to that remaining due 
to the severence of the part condemned; and (3) the damages resulting 
f r om the construction of proposed improvements, even though no par.t is 
taken . 17 
14Tanner v. Bacon, 103 U. 494, 136 P . 2d 957. Wrathall v. J ohnson, 
86 u. 4()"P.Zd 75-5-. -
l5utah Code, 73-l - 4. 
16Ibid., 10 - 7- 4. 
l7Ibid ., 78-34-10. 
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The amount paid the condemnee is based on the market value of the 
property condemned . In cases whe r e only part of the right is condemned, 
t he dif fe r en ce in market va lue befor e and after condemnation rathe r than 
the cost of restoration should be paid. 18 When there is no readi l y 
ascertainable market value, the "inher ent va lue 11 of the right is the 
norm for compensation. 19 
In several western s t a t es water rights can be obtained (los t) by 
prescription . A prescriptive right r esults when an individual, group, 
or corporation can prove in a cour t of law that they have used all or 
any part of the wa t er appropriated by another user, against his will 
and /or wi thout hi s knowledge, over a s pecified period of t ime . Unde r 
these conditions the right to the use of that amount of water pa sses 
direct l y to the adverse user. 20 
Prescriptive right s are not part of Utah water law. In this sta t e 
when condition s exist that would genera lly constitute a prescrip tive 
right, that quantity of water is considered abandoned and rever t s t o the 
public for further appropriation. 
The usufructuar y right t o the use of wa t er given an applicant does 
not give him the right t o use tha t water for any othe r purpose . Once an 
approp r iat i on has been made, a change in use or point of diversion may 
be ~ade onl y by an applic a tion to e nact s uch a change approve d by the 
18
state v . Ward , 112 U. 452, 189 P. 2d 113. 
19
sigurd Ci t y v. State, 105 U. 278, 142 P. 2d 154 , 199 . 
20
samue l C. Wie l, Water Rights in the Wes t ern States , Vo l. 1 (3d 
ed., San Francisco: Bancrof t-\</hitney Company, 1911), pp. 622-640 . 
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State Engineer. 21 Whether or not the vested rights of others are impaired 
is crucial to a proposed change in use or diversion point. However, 
applications will not be rejected solely upon this criterion; if other-
wise proper, it may be approved as to part of the wa t er involved, or upon 
conditions that the conflicting rights be acquired. 22 
Priority of water rights. A common phrase under the appropriation 
doctrine is "first in time, first in right ." This is no less important 
in Utah. 
Priority dates are assigned all vested rights. These dates corres -
pond to the date the initial application was filed with the State Engin-
eer.23 Appropriators have priority among themselves according to the 
dates of their respective appropriations. Under the system employed in 
Utah, the senior appropriator is entitled to receive his whole supply 
before any subsequent appropriator has the right to any water from that 
source . This same procedure follows until all appropr iator s have received 
their fu ll supply or all the water has been diverted and usect. 24 
In times of scarcity, however, priority dates app l y on ly to those 
right s within the same use; i.e., domestic, agricultural, industry, 
recreation, power and others . Priorities are then assigned to uses in 
order of importance to guaran t ee most beneficial uses an adequate supply. 
Domestic uses have been assigned highest priority with agriculture re-
21
utah Code, 73 -3-3. 
22Ibid. 
23
utah Code, 73 -3-18. 
24Ibid., 73-3 - 21. 
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ceiving priority over all uses except domestic. 25 
Water appurtenant to the land. The right to the use of water is 
independent of the right to the land. 26 The Utah Code spec ifies that 
water rights may be transferred in substantia ll y the same manner as real 
estate.
27 Since Utah law also requires that an application to change the 
use or point of diversion must be accepted by the State Engineer prior 
to such a change, parties are not completely free to separate the water 
from the land. The general procedure followed is that a conveyance of 
land passes an appurtenant water right unless specifically deeded separ -
ately in which case, approval of the State Engineer is most gener'ally 
required. 28 
In cases where water rights are represented by shares of stock in 
a corporat i on, they will in no way be considered appurtenant to the 
land . 29 
Evaluation of Utah water law 
It appears that current Utah wa t er laws have progressed a l ong way 
toward establishing water r ights as a property right permitting exchange 
transactions in the market. The requirement that all changes in use or 
point of diversion must first be approved by the State Engineer possess 
25 r b id. 
26
sowards v . Meagher , 218. 
27
utah Code, 73 -3-21. 
2Bwie l, Water Rights in the Western States, p. 586- 594. 
29
utah Code, 73 - l-10 . 
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one possible restriction upon the property right . Whether or no t thi s 
is, in fact, a serious restriction to efficiency wi ll depend on the 
attitude of the Office of the State Engineer as wel l as the s tate and 
district court s in case litigation ensues from a conflict. 
The powers granted the State Engineer in this area are largely 
discretionary and, as such, are continually subject to judic ial review . 
The primary criterion us e d by the State Engineer in making a decision is 
the vested rights of others; will they be impaired by the granting of 
such an application? A liberal attitude ha s prevailed in the Office of 
the Sta t e Engineer over the past 20 year s. 30 Applications have generally 
been gr an t ed as long as a ser i ous impairment of existing rights have no t 
accompanied the change. Applica t ions t o change use are rare ly r e j ec t e d 
since this would generally cause little impairment of rights owned by 
o ther s . Approval of an application to change the point of diversion re -
quires substantial proof that serious impairment of existing rights wi l l 
not follow . 
In a 1951 case, American Fork Irrigation Company v . Linke , the 
courts establi shed a l ibera l po licy in granting changes that has been 
fo ll owed qui t e closely , at least be t ween 1951 and 1962. In uphold i ng a 
court ' s dec ision to reve rse the decision of the State Enginee r in deny-
ing an application, the Supreme Court of Utah held that: 
We r e cognize plainti ff 's duty t o prove that ves ted 
r i ghts will not be impaired by approval of their applica-
30
sased on a r eview of change applications and transfe rs and int er -
views with office personne l, primarily Dallin W. Jensen, Assistant Atto r-
ney General assigned to the State Engineer. 
tion, but we must also recognize that such duty must not 
be made unreasonably onerous, to the point where every 
remote but presently indeterminable vested right must be 
pinpointed. And we cannot turn a deaf ear to every 
request which reasonably appears fo r a more beneficial 
use of water not impairing vested rights, by saying as 
the Engineer in his decision did, that the proposed change 
could interfere substantially with the vested rights of 
others.3l 
27 
This has been the policy of administrators and the court until a 
1962 case dealing with a change application, Piute Irrigation Company v . 
West Panguitch Irrigation and Reservoir Company. 32 The state Supreme 
Court reversed an early decision to allow West Panguitch Irrigation and 
Reservoir Company to store water in reservoirs for summer use which was 
previously used only to flood pasture land during the winter on grounds 
that such storage would not deprive any of the lower water users of water 
that would have reached the Piute Reservoir. In his decision to grant 
the application the State Engineer pointed out that there cou l d be a 
"de minimus" loss of water to the lower users. During the rehearing the 
court asserted that the degree of impairment should play no role in the 
decision; an application should be rejected if there is any impairment 
of existing rights. 
A dissenting opinion in this same case asserted the necessity of 
allowing wide latitude in granting changes in order that water may move 
to its most productive use. 
31American Fork Irrigation Company v. Linke, 121 Utah 190, 239 P . 
2d 188. 
32Piute Irrigation Company v. West Panguitch Irrigation and Reservoir 
Company, 13 Utah 2d 6, 367 P. 2d 855. 
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It seems reasonable that some institution be responsible for protec-
tion of other water users in event of change in use or point of diversion. 
Security of tenure tvould be severely hampered if this we r e not the case. 
Efficiency, however, dictates a liberal transfer policy must be main-
tained. The limitations to efficiency that may resul t from the Piute 
Irrigation Company v. West Panguitch Irrigation and Reservoi r Company 
decision will depend largely on the future direction of the courts. 
For the time being it seems that this latest decision has not essentially 
affected the attitude of those administering the law . 
No loss of priority accompanies permission to effect a change in us e 
or diversion, once granted, thus eliminating a possible barrier to 
applications for such changes. 
A statement sometimes made is that 11Utah's water law and regulations 
prohibit free movement of water resources to the use where they have 
the highest marginal utility.••33 Support for this philosophy is taken 
from section 73-3 - 21 of the Code specifying priorities that will exis t 
in times of extreme scarcity. Probably because of the difficulty invol -
ved in defining extreme scarcity and also because the law is s il ent as 
to whether compensation would have to be paid if water was taken from 
the lower priority use, this sec tion has never been implemented. 34 
33
seth H. Schick, "Demand for Household Water in the Northern Utah 
Area, 1962" (Master's Thesis, Agricultural Economics, Utah State Univer-
sity, 1964), p. 3. Golden Earl Poor, ' ~ater Policy and the Industrial 
Development of Utah" Master's Thesis, Business, University of Utah, 1954), 
p. 34. 
34rnterview with Dallin W. Jensen, Assistant Attorney General 
assigned to the State Engineer, May 15, 1964. 
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I t seems qu i t e he ro i c t o argue that Utah wa t e r law i s ineff i cient 
on the ba s i s of just one emergency requ i r ement that ha s ne ve r been imple -
mented i n practice . One wr i t er s ugges t ed revampi ng this section t o g ive 
indus t r i a l use pri orit y ove r agr i culture .35 Thi s sugges tion would be 
s ubj ec t t o the same criti c i sm a s the rul e tha t agriculture has priority 
over indus try. Both are e s sentially a rbitrary and it is impossible to 
gene ra lize tha t one use i s mo re val uabl e t han another. 
Wha t i s needed i s a f l ex i bl e l aw t hat does no t e stabli sh prioritie s 
at a ll. De l e tion of the r equirement unde r consideration wo uld he lp. 
The mar ke t s hould be pe r mitted t o alloca t e wa t er , even (in fact, e s peci -
ally ) i n times of extreme sc arc it y . I f wor se came to wors e , pu blic in-
stitut ions would still r e tain the power of emine nt domain and co uld 
acquire what eve r water they need to mee t domes tic needs . 
Securit y of tenure does no t s eem t o be a problem with wat er law. 
Once a r ight ha s been ves t ed it cannot be l os t against the owner' s wi shes 
by any means , with the single except i on of em ine nt domain. Even then a 
right wi l l no t be taken fo r any use whi ch the court doe s no t rule t o be 
of gr eate r be nefit to the publi c. Thi s ge ne r a ll y protects the right 
from a ll uses other than domes tic. 
Whe n emine nt domain i s empl oyed, ade qua t e compensation based on 
as ses s e d marke t value, i s guar anteed. By law, this compensation s hou l d 
cove r a ll inve stment in the right a s we ll . 
The r e has been con s iderabl e deve lopment of water resources in the 
pas t few ye ars. Water law in no way res trict s such developme nt and it is 
35Poor , Water Polic y and the Indus trial Deve l opment of Utah, p . 36. 
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genera ll y carried on within t he context of a state insti tution or in 
conjunction with the Federal Government. The state is empowered t o 
en t er into contract for joint studies and development of all water r e -
sour ces within the state. 
In summary, it appear s that Utah wa t er law is r e asonabl y conducive 
to economic allocat ion of the water re source. A sys t em of property 
rights have been establi shed and some are being bought and traded in 
quasi-markets. Thi s i s not to say that all water transactions are effec -
t e d within a market situati on the same as o ther resources, i.e., food, 
c l othing , and real estate . We are not too far removed from the times 
,.,hen lives were lost over ,.,ate r right d i sputes. Water rights still are 
e steemed by many in the same manner as family heirlooms, 36 a situation 
which sometimes prevents an ef ficient, economic a ll ocation of the r e -
source . But this is a problem of attitud e and not of water law. 
The Off ice of the State Enginee r 
Adoption of the appropriative doctrine dictates t hat some person 
or agency mus t accept the r es pons ibilit y of administering arid allocating 
the state 's water resources. There are t wo me thods commonly employed, 
both of which will be co ns ide r e d in this section. 
Judicial allocation of wat er 
The judicial sys t em, a s employed in Colorad o , r equires a prospective 
wa t e r use r to br ing a private suit in the appropriate distr i ct court 
36Frank J. Trelease , "Water Law and Economic Transfer of Water," 
Journal of Farm Ec onomi cs , XLIII (December, 1961), 1152 . 
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requesting the privilege of using water. The petitioner is required to 
furnish evidence that there is unappropriated water and that it wil l be 
put to beneficia l use. Any party protesting the appropriation may also 
37 
testify. 
The task of the district court is to determine: (1) whether un-
appropriated water exists, (2) whether it will be put to benefic ial use, 
and (3) if there wil l be any detrimental third party effects. The court 
wil l decide the case entirely on the evidence presen t ed by the petitioner 
38 
and the protestant. 
Several inherent difficulties in thi s judicial process are: 
1. The court must decide the case on the evidence presented by 
the petitioner or protestant rather than on the testimon y of some quali-
f i ed person representing the public interes t . 
2. Legal criteria ar e gl.ven primary co nsideration; economic criteria 
are almost comp letel y ignored . 
3 . The possibility of collusion ; all the farmers in one area might 
protest a transfer in denfese of a friend, even though the transfer has 
no direct effect on them. 
4. A district court may tend to favor the popular use of wa t er 
within the area over which they preside. 39 
37n. A. Seastone and L. M. Hartman, "Alterna t ive Institutions for 
Water Transfer: The Exper~ence in Co l orado and New Mexico," l and Econ-
omics XXXIX (F e bruary, 1963), 34. 
38Ibid. 
39Ibid . , pp. 35-37. 
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This process had led to costly investment in a future supply rather 
than attempting an appropriation of water through the court. 40 
Administrative allocation of water 
The other primary method places the responsibility of administering 
the state 's water resources under the executive branch of the state govern-
ment. Generally this power r es ides with the State Engineer. The duties 
and procedures fo llowed by the State Engineer in Utah will be discussed 
in detail. 
The instigation of the first comprehensive water law in 1903 gave 
specific responsibilities t o the Office of the State Engineer . To be 
appointed by the governor wi th consent of the senate, the stat e e ngineer 
would have excl usive res ponsibility for supervising the measurement, 
apportionment, appropriation, and distribution of all waters within th e 
41 state. Specifically, the state engineer has the power to: 
1 . Make and abolish rule s and regulations necessary to carry out 
the duties of his office. 
2. Bring suit in courts to enjoin the unlawful use of both sur face 
and underground water and to prevent waste , loss, or pollution of the 
water resources. 
3. Establish water districts and define the boundaries of each. 
No person can be appointed unless he has been a bona fide resident 
of Utah for at l east three years and no less than five years experience 
40Ibid., p. 37. 
41
u tah Code, 73 - 2- 1. 
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as an eng ~neer. 
In accordance with the authority to employ sufficient personnel to 
perform the duties of the office, the Office of the State Engineer emp loys 
engineers, accountants, technicians, office personnel, legal counsel, 
and whatever other personnel are necessary. 43 
The oper at i ons of the office are financed by biennial appropriations 
from the State Legislature, collection and disbursement of f~es in con-
nection with application, photostating of r ecords, and other mi scel laneous 
services, as we ll as funds received from individuals or other organi za -
tions to finance special invest i gation and water distribution. 44 
Determining a valid appropriation 
Upon receipt of an application to appropriate water the state engineer 
must approve or reject the application on the bases of : (1) whether or 
not there is unappropriated water in the proposed source, (2) whether 
or not the proposed use will impair existing rights or interfere with 
a more beneficial use, (3) the technical feasibility of the proposed 
plan, and (4) the financial ability of the applicant to complete the 
proposal as outlined on the application and not for the purpose of spec -
ulation or monopoly. 45 
42Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 73- 2-4 . 
44 
Thirty- Fourth Biennial Report of the State Engineer to the Governor 
of Utah; Biennium July 1, 1962 to June 30, 1964 (Salt Lake City, Utah: 
1964), p. 10. 
45 
Utah Code, 73-3-8. 
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The initial i nvestigation he lp s determine almost simultaneous l y , 
the first two ob j ect i ves. The State Engineer must determine b y inves -
tigating flow records and prior appropriations of the source if ther e is 
sufficient water to satisfy the application withou t impairing exis ting 
right s. He mus t also advise all persons who may have an interest in the 
gran ting of s uch an application of the de tail s s pec i f i ed in the applica -
tion. This is generally done by publication in a news pape r having general 
circulation in the area to be a ffec ted . Any person op po s ing the applica-
tion may f ile a writ t en protes t with the State Engineer. 46 
" ..... 
In dec iding whether or not to grant an applicat i on to appropriate , 
it has been ruled that i n a doubtful case the application should be 
granted , sinc e the po licy of the law is t o prevent waste and promote 
benefic ial use. This means that the State Eng ineer need not find affir-
matively that there i s unappropriat ed water in the source; on l y when th e 
source i s obv i ous l y ful l y appropriated should the appli ca tion be rej ec t ed. 47 
In making his fina l decision the Stat e Eng ineer may requir e whatever 
additional info rmation he fee l s pertinent. For examp l e , he may re quire 
a " statement of financial ability" showing that the applicant(s) is able, 
as well as wi lling , to carry out the proposed work . 48 
Once a dec ision has been made by the Stat e Engineer, that decision 
is f inal unless any person aggrieved by the dec ision wishes to bring 
4 6rbid., 73-3- 6 . 
47Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, V. 76 , p. 116. 
48
utah Code, 73- 3-11 . 
within 60 days a civil action in the district court for a pleanary 
review. 49 
The same general procedure is followed by the State Engineer in 
35 
dealing with applications to change use or diversion point , exte nd time 
in which to perfect a right, and extension of time for nonuse . 5° 
Other responsibilities of the state engineer include determination 
of existing rights to water upon any stream or source. Suit is to be 
brought into district court by the engineer if upon initial investigation 
he f inds evidence to justify a determination. 51 He is empowered to 
cooperate with administrators of other states in determining rights to 
interstate waters as well as appropriating interstate wa t ers . 52 In 
cases whe r e two disputing parties attempt to negotiate an agreement as 
to compensation for impairment of rights, the state engineer acts as an 
arbitrator and often writes their agreement into his decision. 53 
The state engineer appoints water commissioners, enters into inves-
tigations and studies of all water resources in the state, and, as 
pointed out earlier, has general responsibility for all the water within 
the state. 
49 
Ibid., 73- 3-14; 73 - 3-15. 
50rbid., 73 - 3-3; 73-3-12 . 
51Ibid., 74-4-l. 
52
rbid., 73 - 2- 8; 74 - 4-2 . 
53
utah Code, 73 - 2-3. 
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Evaluation of the Office of 
the State Engineer 
An evaluation of the law s under which the state eng ineer operates 
as well as t he position of the courts was discussed in the previous 
section on water law . Thi s eva luation concluded that water law, for the 
most part, does not present a significant barrier to market allocation 
of water. The possible defects in the law, with respect to efficient 
wa t er allocation, are in the area of certain discretionary powers granted 
the state engineer . To the extent that economic cr iteria are ignored 
in the application of these powers, efficiency is impaired. These powers 
and the state engineer's application of them will form the bulk of this 
discussion. 
The first of these powers, and by far the most important, is in the 
area of third party or neighborhood effects . Third party effec t s arise 
because all of the water appropriated and applied to a beneficial use is 
not consumptive l y used, and therefore much of the excess amount finds 
its way into other uses and supply sources, and benefits and/or costs 
accrue to others. While the courts have ruled that a person may not 
acquire a right to have return flow kept up, when that water finds its 
way back to a natural stream54 it may again be sub j ec t to appropriation. 55 
This seepage and r e turn flow may we ll be the basis of another man ' s 
water right. 
54The t erm 11 natural stream" would be s ubj ect to court de termination. 
Brian v. Fremont Irrigation Company speaks of surplus water reentering 
the "stream from which it was taken. 11 
55
clark v . North Cottonwood Irrigati on and Water Company, 79 U.R. 
433 . 
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Since any change in use or poin t of diversion is likely t o affect 
these rights, the law r equires the s tate engineer' s approval t o effec t 
any change . Thi s is an attempt t o protect propert y rights which i s cer -
ta i nly a n important r esponsibil i t y of the law. But this security guar -
an t eed by the l aw, need not result in a decrease of flexibility. The 
mea ns of overcoming this di sparit y i s provided for in the l aw i tself . 
The l aw provides that a n application to effect a change in use or 
point of dive r sion need not be re j ec t e d so l e l y because o f adverse third 
party effects. I f the conf lict of rights can be se ttle d by the disput ing 
parties, the state engineer i s instructed to approve the application. 
This wo uld necessitate negotiations, not only between the t wo primary 
parties , but also the third parties as t o the amount of compensation 
necessary t o cover the loss of productivity that will ensue by allowing 
the transfer. Neverthe l ess, those parties affec t e d, not an agency in 
the sta t e government, are making the f inal decision . The ro l e of the 
state engineer should be to aid in the determination of the third party 
effec ts and l eave the decision as to the compensa tion and whe the r or 
not t o effect the trans fe r t o the parties concerned . The cour ts would 
stand in reserve, a s they now do, to rule on any claim of inequit y 
brought before it by the nego tiating parties. However, this solut ion 
to the problem of third party affec ts has not been frequently us ed. 
The question of equitable compensation must be consid e red in a 
discussion of third party effects. While a water transfe r may adversely 
affect rights in the area of or i gina l use, beneficial effects may a l so 
accrue in the area where the water is transferred, the ne t effect on th e 
entire communit y concerned being approximately zero. The question ari ses 
as to why the party wishing t o trans fer a right should be entirely res-
38 
ponsible fo r compensating adve rse third part y effec ts, withou t receiving 
at the same time reimbursement for third party ga ins in the n ew area . 
If all effects are adverse, then efficiency would require that the trans -
fer be able t o carry these losses, or the trans fe r should not be made. 
But since this is seldom the case, perhaps society should bear th e cos t 
of compensating third party losse s and attempt to capture the beneficial 
effects that wi ll accrue t o new use rs. It i s r easonable to assume that 
increased productivity wil l r es ult from additional water, incre a s ing 
property valuation and even tuall y s tat e tax receip t s . Even if compen-
sa tion is impractical, th e determination of ga in s and loss es is necessary 
to decide if th e transfer i s really economical for the entire community. 
Another discre tionar y power ves t ed in the state engineer allows him 
to deny an application to appropriate water if, after initial inves tiga -
tions, he believe s that granting the application will r es ult in restric-
ting a more benefic ial us e or prove de trimental t o the public welfare . 56 
Again, no us e shou ld be g ive n priorit y over any other use as l ong as 
societ y i s protected f r om such adverse effects as pollution . Insofar 
as the state engineer fo llows we l f are criteria and can acquire the 
requisite information t o make a judgement about social welfar e, the n 
thi s discre tionary power may not be inefficient. But use priorit y of t e n 
involves othe r conside ration s and may be econom ically inefficient . 
A surface examination of the activities of the Office of the State 
Engineer over the past few years indicated considerable r e liance on 
economic c rite ria in reaching dec isions. This further supports the 
56 
Utah Code, 73- 3- 8. 
39 
conc lusion stated earlier in this paper that Utah water la"v is reasonably 
conducive to economic allocation of the water re~ource. 
Regardless of the economic efficiency of the state engineer in the 
past, the state has no guarantee that this will be the case in the future. 
I f the future state engineers tends to be too legalistic, they may not 
give much consideration to efficiency criteria in allowing changes in 
use and point of diversion. To avoid thi s, the discretionary powers 
of the state need to be restricted in the above mentioned ways to insure 
economic efficiency in allocating the state's water resources. 
Utah Water and Pm;er Board 
Responsibilities of the Water 
and Power Board 
"To the end that every mountain stream and every water r esource 
within the state can be mad e to render th e highest beneficial service, 1157 
the State Legislature in 1947 created the Utah Water and Power Board. 
An initial appropriation of $1,000 ,000 wa s made with the intent of 
adding $1,000 ,000 each biennium until a revolving fund of $10,000,000 
was achi eved. The Board consis ts of a chairman and 13 other members 
appointed f rom various water districts throughout the state. 58 In 
addition the Board is authorized to employ engineers, legal counsel and 
all other services it deems necessary. 
57
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The primary goa l of the Water and Po,.er Board is to achieve greater 
utilization of existing supplies and development of new sources. His-
torically, the Federal Government has been most active in this phase 
of water supply. However, most projects undertaken by the Federal Govern-
ment have been quite large and costly, such as the Weber Basin Project, 
Provo River Project, and the Central Utah Project. The sma ll communities 
or ditch companies having need of a small reclamation project to achieve 
greater utilization of water were without financial backing. The Water 
and Pmver Board attempts to remedy this situation by supporting develop-
ment projects too small to get support by the Bureau of Reclamation, Corp 
of Engineers, or other Bureaus of the Federal Government. 
To achieve its objectives , the Board is empmvered to make detailed 
studies and investigations of the water and power resources of the state . 
The Board then makes recommendations upon projects which are in the best 
interest of the s tate and the order in which these projects should be 
undertaken. 59 When the sponsors of a project, aided by the Water and 
Power Board, are unabl e to ob tain financial assistance from any other 
source, the Board may advance stat e funds from its revolving fund. 
These projects are f inanced on a 100 percent reimbursable bas i s without 
interest. The repayment period of a l l funds provided by the Board shall 
conform to the needs and circumstances of the water users. 60 When any 
project is financed by these s tate funds, the prOject r ema ins the pro -
perty of the state until s uch time as the loan is completely repaid. 
59Ibid., 73-10-4. 
60 
Statement of Policy of the Utah Water and Power Board, April 1963, 
Article VIII, Section E., p. 5. 
The right to the use of the water to be derived from the project 
must be appropriated by application to the state engineer. The Board 
is empowered to make this application and take all steps necessary to 
perfect the right . 61 
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Once the project has been completed and the water right granted, the 
Board administers the allocation of the water. Those persons who, in 
the opinion of the Board, can "best utilize" the water from the project, 
are given right to its use. They are in turn assessed a fee which is 
"necessar y and reasonable" for the maintenance of the project and will 
return to the state the actual costs of the project. 62 
The policy of the Board is to support water development regardless 
of the type of sponsoring party. However, if projects of equal merit 
are submitted from individuals or groups, preference is given to t he 
group enterprise . 63 A qualification of this statement concerns censer-
vancy districts or similar organizations with taxing powers. Such 
organizations will not rece ive loans until the Leg islature so directs 
and provides sufficient funds to make the loans. 64 
This development program is unique among the western states and 
many of the smaller projects originating from it have shown a greater 
return per unit of investment than the larger, well known ones .
65 
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sity and Utah Water and Power Board, March 1963, p. 51. 
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The Water and Power Board has been spec i f ically designated to make 
studies, investigations, and the general r es ponsibility for planning all 
water development in the state as well as c oordinating these plans with 
other s tate operations.66 For exampl e, highway construction to the 
extent that it affects any water course must be cleared through the 
Water and Power Board. 
Other obligations of the Board are varied but closely associated 
with water development . SuperViSion and administration of compacts 
affect ing interstate rivers, lake s , and othe r so urces of supply are res -
pons ibilities of the Board. Whenever any age ncy of the state has need 
for water, such as the Department of Fish and Game to build a state 
bird r efuge , application to the state enginee r for that water is to be 
handled by the Water and Power Board. 67 
The duties and powers of the Board, even though they are to be 
litera lly interpreted, do not in any way interfe re with the authority 
of the state engineer. 
Evaluation of Water and Power Board 
The Water and Power Board has no direct responsibility in alloca-
tion of the water resource excep t within areas where a project is being 
financed by the state f unds, and even then, only until the project loan 
has been repaid. The Board has its greatest impact on the efficiency 
of s tat e water policy by granting l oans for developmen t purposes. 
66Utah Code, 73 -10-14 . 
67
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The requirement that loans be repaid 100 percent coincides with a 
basic economic criterion that Penefits exce ed (at least equal) costs. 
Knowing that funds must be complete l y repaid, the sponsors of a project 
would be unwilling to commit themselves to repayment of a project unless 
they were fairly confident that the increased income resulting from the 
project would exceed its cost. 
Possible misallocation of resources mi ght result from the policy 
of granting interest free loans if the only alternative to state finan -
cing is private capital. In such a case the difference in the marginal 
costs of the development project would be substantia l because of the high 
interest rates associated with private loans. A requirement by the Board 
that interest shou ld be charged on their l oans, however, would not 
necessarily so lve this potential allocation problem. Federal Government 
loans do not require interest and in many cases include sizeab l e subsidies. 
Therefore, if the Water and Power Board were to charge interes t, misallo-
cation as between federal and state funds would result. 
Close l y aliened to this question is one which asks if the Legisla-
ture is justified in appropriating $1,000,000 each biennium for sma ll 
reclamation projects. Any government appropriation is subject t o con-
siderable controversy because of the difficulty of evaluating the mar-
ginal returns of social services provided by the government. Perhaps 
the dollar invested in the water development wou ld yie ld a greater 
marginal return i f invested in libraries, educational fac ilities, high -
ways, tourist promotion, or any one of many possible areas of state res -
ponsibility. This is a problem that must be decided by the State Legis-
lature . Greater efficiency might be achieved, however, if those in the 
44 
planning area as wel l as the State Legislature would take an increased 
interest in evaluating marginal returns, wherever possible, assoc iated 
with alternative investment possibilities. 
The planning and coordination of all water development could have 
a significant effect on efficiency of state water pol icy . Past water 
development has been conducted on some\vhat of a "hit or miss " basis . 
Development of irrigational institutions, to be discussed later in this 
paper, at t ests to that fact . The duplication of facilities with i n Salt 
Lake County alone must be extremely costly to the consumers . By coopera-
ting with water institutions of all types and coordinating their develop-
ment plans, considerable savings could be effected . 
Water Pollution Control Board 
Powers and duties of the Board 
The Water Pollution Control Board is the mos t recent of the trio of 
state agencies which have principal concern with water. It was es tab-
lished by the State Legislature in 1953 to develop programs for the 
prevention, control, and abatement of new or existing pollut i on of waters 
in the sta te . 68 
The Water Pollution Contro l Board consists of nine membe r s appointed 
by the gove rnor for t erms of eight years. 69 Specific segment s of the 
s t ate's economy must be represent ed on the Board, each of which might in 
some way affect the pol lution of sta t e waters; the mineral industr y, food 
68oeveloping a State Water Plan, p. 51. 
69
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processing industries, other manufacturing industries, munic i palities, 
agriculture and livestock industries, and fish, wildlife and recreation 
interests. 70 
By law, the executive secretary of the Board must be the chief 
sanitary engineering officer of the State Health Department. The Board 
may employ whatever persons it deems necessary. However, technical, 
legal, or other services should be performed, insofar as is practicable, 
by personnel of the Department of Health and by other state department s, 
agencies and officers. 71 
The powers and duties of the Board include any and all a c t ions 
which may prevent or reduce pollution of state waters. The Board sets 
the standards of water quality and then works with existing agencies and 
various in t erests which may in some way affect t hat standard . They 
have the power to restrict to any degree any action which they believe 
will increase pollution. 72 The decision of the Board is binding upon 
all parties unless appealed to a district court. 73 
One of the primary tasks of the Board is to work with mun i cipal i t i es, 
industries, or others to cons truct or improve exi s t ing t reatment works 
and other remedia l measures to prevent po llution. 74 
70I bid . 
71Ibid. 
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The polic y of the Board thus far has been to urge a cooperative, 
voluntary program of pollution control rather than one of rigorous 
enforcement. 75 Recently the Board has given serious consideration t o 
a policy to emp loy some of their police powers and force municipalities, 
industrial firms, and others to take conclusive s t e ps t o end pollution 
of state waters. 
Evaluation of Water Pollution 
Control Board 
This Board has at present only related interes t in allocation and 
distribution of state waters . It is therefore impossible to evaluate 
its operation under the criteria developed fo r this study. Neverthe l ess, 
water pollution is of growing concern throughout the United States. 
Pollution studies are in progress on most of the ma j or rivers in the 
eastern United States and some in the West. This concern has developed 
because of popu lation growth as well as increased industrial produc t ion 
have resulted in serious pollution of our waters. To make ma t ters worse, 
there ha s been widespread r efusal or neglect by polluting parties to 
voluntarily take steps to ease the problem. 
In essence, water pollution is a pr oblem of "neighborhood effects . 11 
Just as a person cannot utilize his own property in a manner that will 
inflict discomfort or lo ss on those around him, ther e is justificat i on 
for restraining the upstream user from polluting the water supply of 
those below him. 
75League of Women Voters, Utah Chapter, "Water Resources: Support 
of Measures to Promo te Comprehensive Regional or River Basin Planning 
with the State," August, 1960, p. 2 . 
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Although this problem is not yet the most serious one in Utah, con-
cern is growing . The prospects of increased industrialization and popu -
lation growth are increasing this apprehension. It may well be that 
future problems of allocation and distribution will be just as co nc erned 
with water quality as wanter quantity. If so, the Water Pollution Control 
Board will assume a very important role in allocating the state's wa ter 
resources. 
Metropolitan Water District 
The institutions discussed thus far exist at the state level, and 
as such, are concerned with the overall management of the state ' s water 
r esources . In addition to these there are several different types of 
institutions f unctioning at the local level to develop, a llocate, and 
distribute water to the water users in the stat e. The metropolitan 
water district is such an institution. 
Prepara tion and passage of the 
Metropolitan \~ater Di s trict Act 
The recurring water shortages in Salt Lake County during the early 
1900' s and the inability of existing political structures t o take any 
significant steps to alleviate future problems, set the stage for crea-
tion of an institution capable of guaranteeing adequate development 
of water supplies and future needs. In 1931 E. 0. Larsen, District 
Engineer of the United States Bureau of Reclamation, in his feasibility 
report recommending construction of the Deer Creek Proj ec t, also sugges t ed 
the format ion of a metropolitan wa t er d i strict mode l ed after the Met r o-
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politan Water District of Southern California. 76 This suggestion coin-
cided with considerable public sentiment to the effect that any effec-
tive water program could only be accomplished within the context of an 
independent water hoard, which would not be subject to change with city 
administration. 77 
The Metropolitan Water District Act was presented to and passed by 
the State Legislature in 1935. 78 Later in the same year , the State 
Supreme Court returned a decision that the new Act was constitutiona1. 79 
The Metropolitan Water District Act provides for the creation of a 
district within the corporate boundaries of any one or mor e municipali-
ties. The primary purpose of a district is to provide for the water 
needs, both present and future, of all \Vater users within the boundaries 
of the district . Creation of a district in the last analysis rests with 
the peop l e within the pre scribed area of jurisdiction. Initially, the 
legis lative body of any municipality may pass an ordinance declaring: 
(l) the intention to organize a metropolitan water district, (2) the 
names of the cities to be included in the proposed district, (3) the 
name of the proposed district, and (4) the cost to each city of organiz -
ing a district. 80 Once passed this ordinance must be passed upon by the 
76Harris , 100 Years of Water Development, p. 42. 
77Ibid . , p. 42-43. 
78La,,s of Utah, 1935. 
79Harris, 100 Year s of \~ater Development, p. 44. 
80 Utah Code, 73 -8-4. 
legislative bod i es of those municipa l ities to be inc luded in the dis-
trict. 81 
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The ques tion must then be submitted to the e l ec t orate of those 
municipa lities whose legislative body favored creation of a district. 82 
I f a ma j or ity of the e lector s of any one or more of the municipa litie s 
in question vo t e affirmatively, a district wi ll be formed . The Secretar y 
of State wi ll issue a cer tif ica t e of inc orporation c r e ating the district 
which wil l stat e the name of the district and the munic ipalities which 
will be included. 83 
Administration of a metropolitan water district i s ves t ed in a 
board of directors, with a r e presentative for each municipality, appointed 
by the l egis lative body of each respective c ity. Eac h r e pre s entative 
is e ntitle d to one vote for each t e n million do ll ars of assessed valua -
tion of pro perty , provid e d that e ach r e pr esentative has at l eas t one 
vote. The aff irmative vote of members r e presenting mor e than 50 per-
cent of th e vo t es i s necessary to carry any r eso lution coming befor e 
the Board. 84 
When a d i strict encompasses only one municipality, th e Board is to 
cons i st of either five or seven members , t o be decided upon by the legis -
lat ive body of the ci t y, a majority being necessar y t o carry a resolution. 
81Ibid . , 73-8-6. 
82Ibid. , 73-8-8. 
83Ib id. , 73-8- 16. 
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The t erms of office of a director is six years. 85 
The primar y purpose of a metropolitan \Vater district is to acquire, 
appropriate, de ve l op, store, sel l, l ease, and otherwise distribute wa t e r 
for munic ipal and domestic purposes, irrigation, power, industrial and 
all other bene f i cial uses. 86 To accomplish this goal, the district must 
take steps to obtain a supply of the water resource and facili ties t o 
put tha t water to be specified beneficial uses. A district is empowered 
to take by grant, purchase, bequest, or lease, and to hold, lease, sell 
or otherwise dispose of water, water works, water rights, and sources 
of water s upply and any real or personal property of any kind within or 
without the district necessary or convenient to the fu ll exercise of its 
87 powers. 
Especially in the beginning it is often necessary for a district to 
assume bonded indebtedness or a contractual obligation to acquire a 
water supply and/or build the works necessary to service and di stribute 
that supply. When necessary, a district may incur indebtedness not t o 
exceed 10 pe rcent of the value of taxable property within the district. 
They may also enter into contracts with some agency of the Federal 
Government or any private corporation for construction of necessary 
works . 88 
85
rbid. 
86
rbid. 
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Revenue for financing operation of the district, provide for repairs 
and depreciation of \vorks, pay the in t er est on any debt, and provide a 
sinking fund for payment of the principle, are to come from sales of 
water, insofar as it i s practical and possib l e . The directors are re-
quired to fix r ates to accomplish this purpose . 89 When r eve nue from 
wa t er sales are insufficient, a district has the power to tax without 
limitation so far as necessar y to insure the payment of an obligation 
due the United States but otherwise no t to exceed 2 . 5 mil l s . 90 
The principal customers of a di s trict are municipal water de part-
ment s and other agencies already establi shed ,;hose primary purpose is 
to provide wate r services for their r espec tive cities . Water is also 
sold to industry and some fo r agr icultural uses. An important provision 
of the law is that giving priority to domestic and municipal uses. 
Agriculture has priority over industry. 91 
Priority is also given any water uses or users within the district 
over t hose outside. At any time the board of directors can suspend the 
contract, l ease , or other type of agr eement with a user outside the 
district by \Yritten notice one year in advance. 92 
A dis trict, just as any other political subdivison of the state, 
has the power of eminent domain and must adhere to the state r equirements 
f or compensation. 93 
89rbid., 73 - 8-31. 
90Ibid., 73- 8-36 . 
91Ibid., 73 - 8- 18. 
92Ibid . 
93Ibid. 
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The passage of the Metropolitan Water District Act was an attempt 
to remove water development from the realm of politics and end the appar -
ent diseconomies that prevail when several smal l, neighbor ing communi -
ties attempt to deve lop their wa ter supplies independent of each other. 
While it does not seem to have been a specific goal of the originators 
of the Act, a metropolitan water district can (or could) e ff ect great 
ga ins in efficiency by breaking down intercommunity trans fer restric-
tions. To ac hieve th e maximum efficienc y possible, a district would 
have to r equir e that water be allocated in such a way that the value of 
the marginal pr oduct of wa t er in all uses is equal. 
The act provides, with cer tain limitations, that a district could 
act as a retailer, owning or at l e ast controlling a supply of water, and 
sell it to whomeve r it wishes. This would grea tly facilitat e f ree 
transfers of water among uses and users within the community. Any use 
or user co uld obtain a wa t e r s upply by applying for such t o the district 
and, if necessary, bid that amount of water away from a use of lower 
productivity. I f several municipalities can be encompassed within a 
district, the additional efficiency gains of optimum distribution of 
water among munic ipalities , as we ll as among users within a municipality, 
can be achieved . 
The limita tions, prev i ously mentioned, are in the form of a system 
of priorities and reduce the potential efficiency of a metropolitan water 
district. Giving priority to use s within the district and providing 
that any outside user could have his supply cut off in one year ' s time, 
results in ineff icient discrimination, and possibly underinvestment in 
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outside uses. The users outside the district would be unwilling to 
inve st in water works necessary to fully utilize water available from the 
district with such a risky supply. By guaranteeing compensation to cover 
the investment costs which are lost due to cancellation of a water con -
tract (the Act is silent on this point) security could be increased, 
but this would not be likely to completely mobilize water delivery to 
outside users. Maximum efficienc y dictates that all users, within and 
without the district, be treated the same. 
The Act also specifies priorities as be tween municipal, agricul-
tural, and industrial uses. Again this was probably done to protect 
the municipal supply . As was pointed out earlier in the section on 
water law, in a rapidly changing world, any system of priorities can be 
damaging to efficiency. In a marke t al location if domestic use deserves 
first priority, domestic users wi ll bid water away from othe r users, 
in which case the priority would be redundant. As demand for a given 
water supp l y increases, the market can most efficiently dictate which use 
has the greatest value. It seems apparent that industry will not wish to 
purchase water if the value of the marginal product is less than the cost 
of acquiring it. 
Since a metropolitan water district is primarily a distribution 
institution, its method of pricing the water has considerable consequence 
on the effici ency of a district. The actual method of pricing t o be used 
is a decision of the district management . A later section on the munici-
pal water departments discusses pricing methods that might be employed 
in more detail. 
By providing that revenue, for the most part, should come from the 
sale of water, the Act is adhering to the concept that those who receive 
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the service should pay the bill. In addition, there is some justifica-
tion for a small tax levy to cover some of the district's costs. Every-
one wi thin a district, no matter how much or little water they use, re-
ceives some benefits from the program. Incr ease in property valuation 
because of an adequate supply of water is one possible way. However, 
this should not be a major source of revenue and one would wonder if a 
2.5 mill levy under normal conditions and the possibi lity of an unlimited 
tax levy to repay an obligation due the United States were not somewhat 
greater than a small tax levy. 
As is often the case, what could be accomplished and what actually 
takes place in reality, are considerably divergent. The metropolitan 
water districts have increased efficiency, but their full potential has 
not been reached. The best example of this discrepency is the largest, 
best established metropolitan water district in the state, the Metro -
politan Water District of Salt Lake City. 
Established in 1935, soon after the creation of the Metropolitan 
Water District Act, the Salt Lake District was intended to join cities 
of South Salt Lake, Sandy, Holladay, Murray , and others wi th Salt Lake 
City for the purpose of water development. This goa l was never realized 
because of a provision in the original law regarding voting procedure. 94 
This provision stated that when two or more muni cipali ties joined together 
to form a distric t , no one of the municipalities could have more votes 
than all others on the board combined. This would have enabled the 
small suburb cities to out - vote the control city. It is understandable 
94The original provision was ammended to its present status in 1957. 
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why Salt Lake City was unwilling to accept this voting r equirement. 
What i s difficult to see is why some attempt was not made to change the 
law rather than organize a district completely out of harmony wi th the 
purpose of the Act. 
The area of jurisdiction of the Salt Lake City District is the cor -
porate boundaries of Salt Lake City. The district' s water supply comes 
from rights owned in the Deer Creek Div ision of the Provo River Project, 
the water being transported to Salt Lake City by means of a huge aque-
duct. While some service is given outside the district, Salt Lake City 
is the distri c t' s principal customer. In fac t , Salt Lake City has paten-
tial claim on all water held by the district. 
Salt Lake City and the Metropolitan Water Di s tric t duplicate each 
o ther in many ways. Both have supply lines, water processing facilities, 
maintenance men to maintain existing facilities, office staff to manage 
operations and water sa l es, a nd the physical plant of the office itself . 
For all practical purposes the Me tropolitan Wat er District duplicates 
through another organi za tional laye r what Salt Lake City cou ld have done 
and stil l does by itself by amending city statutes t o allow the city to 
accept t he amount of indebtedness necessar y t o subscribe f or 50,000 acre 
feet of Deer Creek Reservoir water. 95 It is intuitively apparent that 
such duplication can l ead only to inefficiency. I f only the f unction of 
the two offices could be combined, efficiency would be increased. 
95Rene Ballard, "The Salt Lake Metropolitan Water District," Utah 
University Institute of Government, Vo l . 1-10, bulle tin no. 5 (Salt Lake 
Cit y: University of Utah, December, 1958), pp . 14-1 5. 
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It seems , however , t ha t some inefficienc ies will always exist in a 
metropolitan water district. Water fo r munic ipal-domest ic use, by the 
ver y nature of the o rganization, will alwa ys r ece ive f irst priority no 
matter what changes in the law are enacted or what preventive measures 
are taken . Th e institutions to be discussed next could overcome this 
obstacle and still insure municipalities of an adequat e wat e r supply. 
Water Conservancy District 
In 1950, the f ir st conservancy district, the Weber Basin Water 
Conservanc y Distr ict, was organized to ad mini s t e r part of the wa ter to 
be deve loped by th e Weber Basin Project. In 1951 the Salt Lake County 
Water Conse rvatio n Distric t was organize d to h e lp mee t the e xpanding 
water needs of that c o unty. Since that time the r e have been several 
more districts fo rme d, mostly in connection with large reclamation pro-
j ects. Some of thes e projects, such as the Central Utah and Dixie pro-
jects are still in the planning and constructio n stages and the conser -
vancy districts es tablished in connection with them have only been able 
to function t o a limi t e d degree thus far. Even the We ber Basin Conser-
vancy District has not functioned t o its fu ll capaci t y since the project 
is n o t yet complete and the Bureau of Rec lamation maintains considerable 
control over its operations. Even so, the Weber Basin District and the 
Salt Lake County District represent the two types of institutions estab-
lished under the Cons ervancy Act thus far. Each has faced many of the 
problems associat e d with the allocation of water on a multiple - use basis, 
and therefore, will serve as illustrations, wherever applicable, of the 
potential of a conservancy district . 
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Organization and responsibi lities 
of a conservancy district 
In many ways the Water Conservancy Act and the Metropolitan Water 
District Act are very similar. Indeed, a reading of the two documents 
reveals whole sections that are identical while many are altered only 
slightly. The primary difference seems to be an expanding of a single-
use institution to one of multiple-use characteristics. 
Under the Water Conservancy Act the district courts are vested 
with the power to establish a conservancy district upon fulfillment of 
specific conditions, to be discussed below. This Act does not, however, 
confer upon the court any responsibility for administration or adjudica-
tion of water rights beyond those duties already specified by Utah law. 96 
Establishment of a district requires a petition be filed by land 
owners within the area proposed for the new district. The petition must 
set forth a general description of the purpos e , contemplated improvements, 
the territory to be included, and a proposed name for the new district. 97 
Anyone opposing the es tabli shment of the district may file a protest 
pet ition which wil l be duly considered and e ithe r accepted or rejected 
at a hearing to consider the original petition. I f the protest petition 
fa ils and the original petition is in complete conformity with the Act, 
the court shall declare the district organized and it will be recognized 
as a political subdivision of the state of Utah with all the powers of 
96
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a public or municipal corpora tion . 98 
The conservancy district is governed by a board of director s , 
app o int e d by the district cour t , each serving terms of three years . 
Employees of the district include a secre t ary, who may or may no t be a 
member of the board, and whatever engineers, attorneys, and other per-
sonne l ar e deemed necessar y by the board. 99 
A water conservancy district, once created, ha s much broader inter-
ests and responsibilitie s than most wate r ins titutions in the state of 
Utah. The general purpose and goal of the Water Conservancy Act are to 
develop and control all unapp r opriated water of the state and to obtain 
from that water the highest duty possible . lOO These goals indicate res -
ponsibili t y not on l y t o many users, but als o to seve ral uses . To achieve 
this broad goal the conse rvancy district both wholesales and re tails 
water for domest ic, agricultural, industr ial, and all other beneficial 
purposes. 
A district may incur indebtedness for th e cons truction of whatever 
facilitie s the bo ard deems necessary to comple t e l y acc omplish the goals 
of the district . However, a majority vote of a ll property owners within 
t he di s trict i s necessar y before incurring any debt. 101 
A co nservanc y district has the power t o tax up to a maximum of one 
mill on the do llar of assessed property va luation within the district 
98Ibid., 73-9-6; 73-9-7 . 
99Ibid . , 73-9-10; 73-9-7. 
lOOibid., 73 -9-l. 
101lbid., 73-9 - 35 . 
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under normal conditions to help finance the operation and maint enance of 
the system. 102 An additional one -hal f mill may be l evied whenever the 
system is unable to punctually pay the annual installments on its con -
tract or bonds or interest thereon. 103 
Of initial importance in the development of a conservancy district 
is the water right to a supply which can be distributed and allocated 
to prospective users. In general a district can obtain its water supp l y 
in any of the several ways provided by Utah law. 
The method most common ly used thus far has been to contract with 
some agency of the Federal Governmen t for the construction of necessary 
wa t er works. Actually, the above statement is not altogether true since 
the general procedure is to es tablish a conservancy district in connec -
tion with a large reclamation project. However, the end result is the 
same, the district administers the waters to be developed by the pro -
j ect and is responsible for repayment of the obligation due the United 
States. 104 
The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District emp l oyed other 
means to gain its water supply. Those sources are: (l) wells obtained 
by application to the state engineer, (2) spring wate r obtained by pur-
chase of shares in an irrigation company having water rights to that 
source, and (3) wholesale purchase of finished water from the Metropolitan 
lOZibid., 73-9 -1 6. 
103
rbid. , 73-9-20. 
104seven Year Summary of the Weber Basin Conservancy District; 
June 1950 to December 1957, p. 3. 
bU 
Water District of Salt Lake City.l05 
Since the possible tax levy is relatively low, the primary source 
of revenue open to the district is the sale of water. In keeping with 
this, water is sold to municipal, industrial, agricu l tural, and any 
other be neficial use . 
Allocation of the water supply 
The ability to use water within a district is obtained by applica-
tion which must present all pertinent information, including ~arne of 
applicant, quantity and quality of water desired, description of use, 
and an agreement to pay the price per unit of water decided upon by the 
board as well as other rules and regulations of the board. 106 
The boar d, at its discretion, may accept or r e ject any application, 
its criterion being the best interest of the district . 107 Once accept ed, 
the district will enter into a specific contract with the applicant, 
depending on the nature of the intended use and quality of water needed. 108 
Thus far the largest customers of the conservancy district, like 
the metropolitan water district, have been the municipalities themselves 
and the institutions already established withi n the municipalities t o 
serve the needs of citizens. The district negotiates a contract to meet 
the needs of both parties. Contracts can be negotiated for any number 
of years , although the general polic y has been to establish the length 
of the contract to cover the period of indebtedness incurred during the 
105
water: Our Eve r Growing Need (Report of Salt Lake County Water 
Conservancy District, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1962) , p. 12. 
l06utah Code, 73 -9-19. 
lO?Ibid. 
lOBrbid . 
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initial deve l opment. 109 The price to be paid for the water , to be deter -
mined by the board , is part of the contract. That price can be changed 
at any time, but if increased, the contracting party has the o ption to 
cancel or continue the contract. 110 
A district can retail water to domestic as well as industrial users 
within its boundari es provided that, in the case of domes tic use, the 
user is not serviced by any municipa lity which was incorporated at the 
time of the district's creation. lll Applications and contracts for these 
uses of water are substantially the same as those for municipalities. 
\... A statement made many times in the Water Conservancy Act is that 
rates and charges shall be " equitable although not necessarily equal or 
uniform for like classes of service throughout the district. , ll 2 This 
s tatement , whi le included in the specification of all types of water 
sales, has its most gene ral application in sales to irrigation users. 
Under the Conservancy Act, irrigation users must app l y for wa t er 
and enter into contract with a district the same as other users, agreeing 
to pay the price determined by the board. 113 The Salt Lake County Dis-
trict has only one class of water, the price of which is too great to 
109
rnterviews with Wayne M. Winegar, Manager of Weber Basin Conser-
vancy District, July 15, 1965, and Rober t B. Hilbert, Manager of Salt 
Lake County Conservation District, July 28, 1965. 
110
rbid., Hilbert. 
111
utah Code, 73- 9-19; 73 -9-13. 
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induce purchase by agricultural users. The Weber Basin District fur nishes 
considerable water for irrigation. That water is priced in relation to 
the additional production than can be generated by the increased water 
s uppl y, as computed by the Bureau of Reclamation. This has resulted in 
extremely low prices for irrigational water, much lower than the price 
for the same water when sold to industry . 114 
There i s also a limit set by the Bureau as to the amount of water 
that will be supplied for irrigated land. This figure is supposed t o 
represent the maximum amount of water necessary for agricultural produc-
tion within the district . The district may only supp ly each irrigator 
with enough water so that his total supp l y, other water sources included, 
will not exceed that figure. At present, in the Weber Basin District 
3 acre-feet per acre is the maximum. 115 
Evaluati on of the water 
conservancy district 
The water conservancy distr icts that can be created under the Water 
Conservancy Act have great potential in efficiently allocating wa t er. Of 
course, like all political institutions, the conservancy district may 
not be comp l etely efficient , from an economic point of view. The following 
discuss ion will attempt to point out the features which ar e conducive to 
eff ici e nc y as well as discuss the obstac l es to economic eff icie ncy in 
operation today. 
114
rnterview with Winegar . 
11\bid. 
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Unlike most water institutions in the state, a water conservancy 
district is not es t ab li shed to serve one particular use; e . g ., met ropo li-
tan water districts for domestic uses and irrigation companies for agri-
cultural use. Its boundaries are set to include all uses and users 
within a common area. This enab l es the district to allocate water between 
uses without priorities and discriminatory quotas and pricing. 
Inef ficiency can result whe n distric t policy toward negotiating 
contracts for wa t e r use is too inflexible . As previously noted, con-
tract s can be nego tiated for any l e ngth of time acceptable to both parties, 
but the general procedure has been to contract for the length of indebted -
ness. The r e are indications that the Weber Basin Conservancy District 
has been reluctant to deviate from this policy. 116 Persons needing 
water have been willing to obligate themselves for 60 years, the life 
of the district bond. In years when they haven't needed the entire 
quantity provided by their contract, they are restrained from trading 
or selling that water to some other user, even if facilities exist to 
initiate the transfer . This tends to make water appurte nant t o the land 
once a contract has been negotiated. 
It is true, the con tracting party realizes his ob ligation when initia-
ting the contract. But the future i s replete wi th many kinds of uncer-
tainties that produce changed conditions . Flexibi lit y in water use by 
subcontracting wou ld seem to increase use efficiency. Besides, the 
district would be no worse off as long as that particular quantity of 
water i s paid for as stipulated in the initial contract. 
116
rnterview with Winegar. 
These inflexible present allocations cannot be laid entirely at 
the feet of the district directors. Sinc e the Weber Basin River Proj ect 
is stil l under construction, much of the control of district water is 
in the hands of the Bureau of Reclamation. In addition, the district 
is having difficulty selling enough water to meet its obligations, a 
problem to be discussed directly later in this section. Apparently 
those responsible believe that be refusing to allow these transfers, 
and se lling or renting additional water to the consumer desiring addi-
tional water, that revenue will be increas ed. 
This will probably not be the case. If the buyers know that sub-
contracting is impossib l e and that they themselves will have to pay for 
the water which they contract to receive, no matter what ci r cumstances 
prevail, they will be unlikely to offer as high a price as they would 
i f greater flexibility were permitted. In fact, it seems that if con-
tracts were negotiable throughout the period of the contract, a large 
amount of uncertainty could be overcome. This flexibility would give 
a large boost to more and larger contracts, and therefore, revenue would 
be increased. 
The Salt Lake County Conservancy District, on the other hand, has 
exhibited much more flexibility in negotiation contracts . While their 
indebtedness runs for 50 years and most of their contrac ts are for that 
period of time, they have been willing to meet the needs of any user. 
Emergency con tracts have been negotiated whi ch offer no guaran t ee that 
the district will furnish any wa t er if supplies are short, or that 
obligate the consumer to purchase any wa t er from the district. Water 
will be made available upon demand so long as the district fee ls there is 
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a sufficient amount of water in its system to meet other contracts. 117 
The flexibility with which water transfers can be made and the secur-
ity against tenure unc ertainty granted in the contract seems to be depen-
dent on those initiating the contracts rather than being contained in 
the Water Conservancy District Act itself. 
Since a conservancy district must rec eive the bulk of its revenue 
from water sales, an admirable requirement of the Act, the pricing poli-
cies of a district play a most important role in determining its econo-
mic efficiency. The districts are relatively f r ee to choose their own 
methods of pricing and again, as has already been stated, a detailed 
discussion of the pricing methods most commonly used in Utah is contained 
in a later section of the thesis. There seems to be, however, a signifi-
cant problem within the conservancy districts that will require at least 
some di scussion of pricing policies here. 
Optimum efficiency in pricing r equires that the same price be charged 
for each unit of wate r consumed and that the price be the same for all 
users. The statement made througout the Act that rates and charges 
shall be "equitable although not necessarily equal or uniform for like 
classes of service throughout the district," is in direct vio l ation of 
this requirement. If prices are not the same to all users, the value of 
marginal utility of water to all users will not be equal in equilibrium, 
result ing in inefficient allocation of water . 
This statement in the Act does not require a district to price dis-
criminately but certainly leaves the door open fo r the districts to do 
117Interview with Robert Hilbert and examination of some district 
records. 
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as they desi r e . A case in point is the Weber Basin Conservancy Dis trict. 118 
The Weber Basin District both whol esales and r e tails wate r to munici -
pal industrial, agricultural, and other be ne ficial users, throughout the 
countie s of Weber, Davis, Morgan, and part of Summit. For each use, a 
different price is es tablished. This is justifiable to the extent that 
the difference in pric e reflects the difference in cost of supplying 
the users. For instance, water so ld to industry is approximately half 
the price of water to municipalities, the difference being the cost of 
f inishing th e wa t e r, since industrial usage does no t always require high 
quality water. Considerable inefficienc y is ev ident, however, when 
irriga tional use is considered. 
As \4as earlier pointe d out, the price of water for irrigation is 
dependent on the increased productivity generated by the increased 
water supply, as computed by the Bureau of Reclamation. This price is 
considerably below the price set for industrial users utilizing the same 
quality of water. This r esults in a subsid y t o agricultural users and 
an ineff icient allocation of the wate r resource. 
Optimum pricing i s f urthe r restricted by the pr esence of a "quota" 
system on wate r for agriculture which wou ld prevent consumers f rom push-
ing consumption to the point where value of the marginal product equal s 
marginal price. 
As previously noted, the We ber Basin District is unable to sell 
enough wate r to meet its obligations due the Federal Government and its 
bond ho lders . At present, they are supposed t o receive an additional 6,000 
118
rnterview with Winegar. 
acre fee t in 19 66 . At the same time the number of new contracts for 
water has not been increasing. 119 
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First observation would indicate that either the price is set too 
high or supply far exceeds demand. In the field of water development it 
would be highly inefficient to produce only those uni,ts. of water needed 
at the present time. Therefore, it is possible that supply, at least in 
the short run, could exceed demand. An inves tigation of the municipali -
ties within the district, however, shows considerable interest in develop-
ing new supplies. Many are drilling wells and some investigating the 
possibility of building their own water purification plants. 120 Appar-
ent l y the demand fo r water is increasing right along with the supply. 
The obvious alternative to lack of demand is too high a price. The 
users can produce their own water less expensively than they can buy 
it from a district. This explanation seems satisfactory until the pric-
ing policy of a similar institution is considered. The Salt Lake County 
Water Conservancy District, serving a similar market, charges municipali-
ties $12.50 more per acre foot and industrial users considerably more. 121 
Even at their highe r rates, the Salt Lake District has no trouble con-
tracting water sales to meet increasing demand. This comparison may be 
misleading because the two markets are obviously not the same . Never-
theless, it seems reasonable that some other factors, such as the greater 
security associated with owning its own supply or inflexible negotiating 
119Ibid. 
lZOibid. 
121
rnterview with Hilbert. 
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policies of the district may be causing this problem. 
An interesting study would be to determine s t atisticall y if the 
ci t ies within the Weber Basin District can develop their own supplies 
at a lower cost than by buying them from the Distric t. I f no t, what 
exp l ana tion can be given fo r the reluctance of these municipalities t o 
contract for Weber Basin water? 
The Water Conservancy Ac t has gr eatly expanded t he potential fo r 
efficient a l location of water. A conservancy dis trict has the advantage, 
like the metropolit an water district, of traversing large areas, fac ilita-
ting transfers within that area. The conservancy di s trict has the added 
advantage that no priority system is written into the Act. Another ad -
vantage of the district i s its l ow t axing power. This should fo r ce it 
to r e l y more on a market al l oc ation of water and attempt to maximize the 
r ent on the water s upplies it control s . 
The wate r conservancy district could be the best attempt, thus far, 
t o r emove transfer restric ti ons and faci litate gr ea t er f l exibi l ity and 
overal l efficiency i n allocating wa t er. At present these goa l s are no t 
be ing fully achieved but the potential r emains for an efficiency- conscious 
management to i mplement . 
The Mutual Irrigation Company 
Ocigin and deve l opmen t 
The mutual irrigation company had its origin in the small community 
cana l built and used cooperatively by the Mo rmon pioneer s . Be ing iso-
l at e d from oth er communities and de pending grea tly on each other, l ocal 
control of the ditches presented no serious problems . But as towns and 
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cities grew they came to include many inhabitants who were no t farmers 
and had little interest in or even sympathy with farming operations. 
Hence, for most ditches separate organizations were eventually developed 
to include only the water users directly involved. 122 
The f ir s t irr iga tion company, the Pr ovo Canal and Irrigation Com-
pany, was incorpor ated by the Terretorial Legislature in 1853 and was 
grant ed a l l the powers of a corporation. 123 A few o the r companies were 
established by the Terre torial Le gis latur e but ex tensive organi zation 
of suc h companies did not come until the water law of 1880 provided that 
irrigation companie s could be formally incorporated under the corporate 
laws of the state fo r irrigation purpo ses. 124 
Organization and practices 
The mutua l company consists of several wat e r users utilizing the 
same water system for essentially the same purpo se . These organizations 
may or may not be incorporated depending upon the demands made upon the 
company and the congeniality of the membership. Wher e membe r ship is 
large or wher e the organizat ion might be subj ec t to litigation, they 
are usuall y incorporated. 125 
122 
Hutchins, ,Mu t ual I rriga tion Companies in Utah, pp. 16 - 18. 
123Geor ge Thomas, The Deve lopment of Ins titutions Under Irrigation 
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1920), p . 48. 
124Hutchins, Mutual I rrigation Companies in Utah, p. 24. 
125
orson W. Israe ls en, e t al., Irrigation Companies i n Ut ah: The i r 
Activities and Needs, Utah Agricultural Experiment Station Bu l letin 322, 
March 1946, p. 11. 
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It is very important to note that a mutual company is not, strict l y 
speaking, a public institutiOn delivering water to a public use. It is 
a private , non-profit organization established t o supply wa t e r at cost 
to members only. As such, they are not subject to public control be-
yond those applicable to any other commercial enterprise in the state. 
A board of supervisors or other public body has no power t o fix rates or 
charges of the company . Nor can a company be forced to supply water to 
126 
anyone not owning stock in the company . 
The company assets include ditches, canals, laterals, reservoirs, 
and other works necessary to deliver water to the members. More impor-
tant, the water rights are owned in most cases by the company . Each 
member is entitled to receive the propor ti onate share of water carried 
by the company system which his stock bears to the capital stock of the 
company. The shares of stock held by each member, at least initially, 
are dependent on any one or a combination of the following factors: 
(1) the amount of capital or labor contributed toward the initial construe-
tion of the company facilities, (2) the quantity of water he ld by rights 
transferred to the company, or (3) the number of shares purchased from 
the company or other stockholders. 
In a few cases the water rights are not owned by the company, but 
are he ld by the members in the same manner as before the company was 
formed. In such a case the on l y function of the company is t o pro~ide 
means of transporting water from its source to point of use, This system 
has not proven conducive to a flexible wa t er market and today is the 
126 
Weil, Water Rights in the Western States, Vol. II, p. 1159. 
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exception rather than the rule. 127 
Even where water rights and other water works are held as assets 
of the company, they are not managed the same as other corporations. 
Instead of charging for the water furnished and applying the sale or 
rental r evenues t o pay the maintenance and operationa l expenses and divi-
dends on the stock, no charge whatsoever is made for water. The expense 
of management and maintenance of the company i s to be met by assessments 
on the stock which may be paid in cash or labor. 
The stock certificate ent itles its owner to receive a portion of 
water in the company which may be used at the discretion of the stock-
holder on any lands which can be serviced by the company ditches. 
Whether or not these shares of stock, representing water, may be bought, 
sold, rented, or otherwise exchanged within the company, is a policy to 
be decided upon by the stockholders. Some companies require all trans-
fers of water to be made prior to the opening of the irrigation season 
and permit no changes thereafter; others allow a change once during the 
season ; still others permit changes more often or have no r estrictions 
whatever. But all companies do allow stock to be transferred within 
the company. 128 
When transferring water between users the market va lue of the stock 
or the price becomes the basis upon which such transactions are nego-
127
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tiated. Market value is a function of demand and supply, dependent upon 
the forces at work in the market. When water supplies are short, price 
has a tendency t o rise. Expected high prices for farm products will 
have the same effect . Prices may be depressed by excessive precipita-
tion or early frosts. In essence, the market value of the stock is 
dependent on a combination of fac tor s which affect in some way the 
supp l y of water or potential production associated with that supply. 
The important point is that this value is variabl e and is determined by 
those wishing to use the water in product ion. 129 
Incorporation of the mutual company overcomes one of the serious 
problems faced by the more informal organizations --collect i on of assess-
ments. A Utah law allows the corporations to sell the shares of stock 
upon which assessments are not paid. 130 This furnishes a strong induce -
ment to meet the assessments since much of the land in Utah, without 
shares of stock representing water, is worth considerably less . 
Management of a company rests with a board of directors selected 
by the stockholders from the membership of the company. Even though 
corporate law places the minimum number of directors at three, the ten-
dency is to have larger boards with five to seven members. The directors 
are e l ected for a one-year t erm and are responsible fo r all funct ions 
of the company, such as assessing the stock and determining improvements 
to be made. The board may appoint a secretary-treasurer, water - master, 
129Hutchins, Mutual Irrigation Companies in Utah, pp. 34-36. 
130Elwood Mead, Irrigation Inst itutions, (New York: The MacMillan 
Company, 1903), pp. 235-238. 
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and such other employees as may be necessary. 131 
The fact that the mutual company has been so adaptab l e t o irrigation 
problems in Utah has l ed to it s most serious shortcoming . At f irst com-
munities were small and very fe'\v primary dtiches cou ld ad equately serve 
all 'tvat e r us ers in th e area. These situations were r e ad i ly organized 
i nto a mutual company. As the state developed additiona l sett l ers would 
move into the already we ll es tablished communities. At f ir s t they were 
readil y accepted and given shares in the company merely on the promise 
that they would do some wo rk on the ditch in the future . As the supp lies 
became mor e fully utilized, this policy changed. Rather than deve l op 
new supplies and build new ditches, the companies mere l y res tricted mem-
bership. 13 2 Thi s forced the organization and deve lopmen t of additiona l 
companies to service acreages contiguous to those already being serviced 
by a mutual company. Today it is not uncommon to have three , four, f ive, 
or even mo re companies serving one c ommon area. In many cases severa l 
ditches , each belonging to a di ffe rent company, of t en run paralle l to 
each o ther for several miles, resulting in excess land in ditc hes and 
considerably greater wa t er l osses due t o seepage and evaporat i on. 
Evaluation of the mutual 
irrigati on company 
The degr ee of efficiency of the mutual irrigation company depends 
on whether they are evaluated individually or in r e lation to other com-
panie s. Consid ered individually the mutual company offers perhaps the 
131Hutchins , Mutua l Irrigation Companies in Utah, pp . 34-36. 
l32Ibid ., p . 18 . 
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best example of a flexible, market allocation of water of any institu-
tion in the state. Intracompany transfers can be made almost completely 
at the discretion of the water user. 
Security of tenure is no problem within a mutual company since 
stock in the company is real property and can be lost only by the owner's 
own choice to sell or by failure to meet assessment~, which is in essence 
also his own choice , since he realizes that delinquent assessment s could 
result in loss of stock in the company. 
Another desirable quality is that management of the district is 
maintained by those who are directly concerned and acquainted with the 
local probl ems . 
By joining together to develop a common supp l y the early pioneers 
increased the efficiency of the ir operations by spreading the cost of 
bui lding and maintaining a water distribution facility over many indivi-
duals. Also conveyance losses were reduced because of the use of a 
common canal rather than separate canals of smaller dimensions. Although 
some savings have been realized, they have been and are considerably 
less than they could have been had their members been able t o anticipate 
the potential future growth of irrigation and expand rather than res-
trict their company's gr owth. Therein lies the primary ine ff iciency 
of the mutual company. 
The re are, as of 1959, 967 mutual irrigation companies serving 
1,178,034 of the 1,300,483 acres of irrigabl e land in Utah. 133 This 
places an average of 1,218 acres of land under each company. This is a 
133united States, Census of Agriculture, 1959, p. 333. 
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deceiving figure since some companies in the Del ta area, for example, 
service a pproximatel y 20,000 acres each. Therefore, the median acres 
of land unde r each company would be considerably less than 1,211 acres , 
probably about 400 or 500 acres. Whatever there exac t size may be, 
severa l companies now service an area which could probably be more 
efficient l y serviced by one mutual company. 
Having stated that intracompany transfers can be easily made, it 
must be remembered that maximum efficiency also dictates that wa t er 
should be able to move to th e use of greatest marginal productivity. 
This wou ld necessitate water being able to move t o any use or point of 
use within a common area; i.e., between companies. This condition is 
not widely achieved. 
Utah law provides that one company may own shares of stock in an -
other135 but the articles of incorporation of most companies do not al l ow 
this. Even when provided for by the articles of incorporation, i t i s 
not uncommon to charge an unrealistically high fee to transfer water into 
another company ditch, further r es tricting flexibility . 
The problem of f l exibil ity as between uses within an irrigation 
company does not seem to be significant since very few companies suppl y 
water for household us e , other than lawn watering. 
A mutual company may also have problems with sec urit y . Security 
against physical uncertainty is common in the smaller companies because 
of their inability or reluctance to initiate capital investment in water 
storage, ditch lining or other means of better utilizing a company ' s 
135
utah Code, 73-l - 13 . 
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water rights. 
There are some prob l ems of tenure uncertainty arising between 
companies. Because many companies function in a common area, it is 
inevitable that the actions and decisions of one company will affect 
other companies on the same system. This has l e d to extensive litiga -
tion. The common law of Ut ah, with respect to water, has developed 
almost exc lusively from suit s be tween mutual companies . Litigation is 
both expensive and time con suming and result s in waste of resources. 
Th er e is evidence that mutual companies are moving to correct these in-
eff iciences , primaril y by consolidation. The number of mutual companies 
i n Utah declined by 73 be t ween 1949 and 1959 . 136 This is even more 
significant by noting tha t the number of inc or porate d compan i es actually 
increased by 17 while unincorporated companies decreased by 90. 137 Even 
wh er e actual consolidati on has not been accomplished, some companies 
have reached a stage where they are enjoying all the advantages of con-
so lida ti on except for ac tual management. 
There is, however, st ill considerable oppos ition to the consolida-
tion of companies. As explained in a paper by Dudley Crafts, this s t ems 
partly f rom the particular nature of irrigation farming under mutual 
138 
irrigation companies. 
The farmer is interes ted in the company on l y as it 
affects him personall y. He is primarily interes ted in 
the wate r delivered to him at hi s headgate and his actions 
136u. S., Census of Agriculture, p. 333. 
137 Ibid. 
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nudley Crafts, "Prob l ems in t he Reorganizati on of Irrigat i on 
Companies in the Sevier River Basin, Utah. " (Unpublished paper) 
are governed by that in t eres t. He seldom refers to him -
self as a stockholder , but ra the r an owner of a water 
r i ght within the company. That is why he wil l join 
readily wi th other s and put fo rth an incr edible effor t 
t o build a reser vo ir. He knows that the building of the 
r eservoir wi ll increase the quantity or dependability of 
the wa t e r at his headga t e , or it might do bo th . But when 
it comes to the actual de livery of water at his head gate 
the more weight hi s voice carries the better. For this pur -
pose he t ends to favo r sma ll organizations . He r egard s a 
portion of the water owned by the company as his own pe r-
sonal propert y and he wants to have as much to do with its 
management as poss i bl e . ... Mos t of all the farmer wants to 
protect his wate r r~ght s. He f ee l s that this will best be 
accompl ished by some one in hi s immediate ne ighborhood . . . 
Ther e i s no gett ing awa y from the conc lus ion that gen-
erall y sma ll mutual irrigation companies ar e was t eful, ex-
pensive , and ineffic ient, but the farmer sticks by them be-
cause he enjoys the fee ling that he is managing his own 
affair s .139 
Increased demand upon the wa t er r esources of the state may force 
mutual companies to sacrifice some of the ir independence for increased 
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e f f i c i ency. If consolidation can be achieved, the mutual company could 
well be the most ef ficient institution in the state for servicing a gri -
cultural users . 
Irrigation District s 
Evolu tion of the irrigation district 
Irriga tion (some times called water conservation) districts, as they 
are provided for by Utah law, had the ir beginning in t he Utah Irrigat i on 
Distric t Act of 1865. This Act was an attempt to provide for grea t er 
deve lopment of wat er fo r irrigation by organizing per sons in a common 
area, usually a county or some part there of, into an irr igation district . 
139Ibid . , pp. 33 - 34. 
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Ditches , reservoirs, and other necessary works were to be built coopera-
tively by the land owners within the district and to be financed by taxes 
placed upon the lands. No provi sion for bondi ng was included. 140 
Despi t e continued r evisions of this statute, only a few districts 
we r e organized and none of them were successful. In 1897 the Act was 
repealed. 141 
Twelve years later in 1909 a new act was passed. This legislative 
move was in respons e to those 'l:vho wanted to fo llow along the lines of 
the Wright Act of California and bond the land for con s truction of 
rese rvoir s, dams, and canals . The legislation providing for irrigati on 
district s in Ut ah today is an evolvement of thi s Act, having undergone 
142 
cons iderabl e amending. 
Establishment of an irrigat i on district 
Und e r the law a district may be formed i f and when the gover nor, 
upon r e commenda tion of the State Engineer, or 50 o r a majority of land 
owner s within the proposed dis t r ict, so request. 143 The request must 
come in the form of a petit ion and state the proposed means o f water 
supply a s we ll as the name pr oposed for the district. 144 After pre-
liminary water surveys and allotments and after public i z ing the irriga-
140Hutchins, Mutual Irrigation Companies in Utah, pp. 20 - 23 . 
141Ibid. 
142Thomas , The Development of Institutions Under Irrigation, p . 126. 
143 Utah Code, 73 - 7-1 . 
144 
Ibid . , 73- 7- 2. 
79 
tion district proposal, land owners within the proposed district decide 
by public election \<hether or not a district \<ill be formed. 145 Land 
owners are entitled to one vote for each acre foot of water allotted 
to th em with a majority of votes cast being necessary to create a dis-
146 
tric t. 
Management of the district resides in a three man board of directors 
elected by popular vote of the water users within the district. The 
district will employ a secretary and whatever attorneys, agents or 
employees that are required . 147 
Generally, there is a particular water supply in mind for allocation 
by the district 1vhen it is proposed. The district becomes the owner of 
that right by application to the State Engineer and can construct or 
acquire by contract purchase, or condemnation, canals, ditches, r eser -
voirs, rese rvoir sites, irrigation systems or works, and any other land 
or facilities the directors deem necessary for attainment of the di s -
trict goa ls . The di strict may also use any of the above mentioned 
methods to increase their water supply. 148 
The law passed in 1909 differed substantially from the Irrigation 
District Act of 1865 in only one way; the power to issue bonds. Prior 
to issuing bonds, the direc tors must make an estimate of the amount of 
money necessary to enlarge or construct the system and submit all per-
145Ibid., 73-7 - 3. 
146Ibid., 73-7 - 3; 73-7-4. 
147 
Ibid., 73-7-ll. 
148Ibid. 
tinent information to the water users in the district for considera-
tion . 149 After 20 days an election is held, t~<o -thirds of all votes 
cast affirmat i vely being necessary to authorize the bond issue. 150 
Repayment of the bonds as well as the interest thereon and any 
other maintenance or construction expenses not covered by th e bond 
80 
issue is to be met by assessment levies against the land owners within 
the district. 151 Those assessments are in the form of a tax l evy and 
are to be col l ected by the county treasurer in like manner to other 
taxes. 152 These taxes constitute a first lien upon the property asses -
sed, providing for their sale to pay the taxes, if delinquent. 153 The 
district may also fix rates of tolls and charges to be collected from 
the land owners directly by the district to meet any additional expens es . 154 
Allocation of district water 
During the initial or gani zation of a district the State Engine er 
is required to make an allotment of the available water supply to the 
land within the district. This allotment is supposed to represent the 
maximum quantity of water which could be beneficially used on each tract 
of land . 155 After organization is complete and the directors know the 
l49Ibid. , 73 - 7-14. 
15°rbid. 
151rbid., 73- 7- 17. 
152
rbid., 73 -7-20. 
153
rbid., 73-7-21. 
154Ibid., 73-7-24. 
155Ibid . , 73- 7- 2 . 
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quantity of water availab l e within the district, they are to make a 
revision of the water allotment, provided that they do not increase the 
allotment made by t he State Engineer wi thout hi s perm i ssion. 156 An 
exception to this rule can be made when additional water is obtaine d by 
the di strict. 157 
When there is surplus water in the district, the board of directors 
may l ease or ren t the use of that wa t er to municipalities, corporations, 
associations, or individuals within or withou t the district. However, 
no l ease or rental agreement may run for more than five years in time 
and no vested r i ght t o the use of that wate r will acc rue to the us e rs. 158 
The Act also pr ovides that any land owner wi thin the district may 
assign the who l e or any portion of the wa t er apportioned t o hi s land, 
to any o ther land mvner within the district. Such a transaction can be 
a ccomplished only with the consen t of the board. 159 
Miscellaneous provi sions of 
irrigation di s tricts 
Genera lly speaking, formation of an irrigation district offers a 
means of organizing all water users within a g iven area, even those not 
wishing t o participate, into a cooperative e ffort to develop land for 
irrigation. The law does provide that any land owner wi thin the district 
156Ibid . , 73-7-11. 
157Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
159 
Ibid. 
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may petition the district to exclude his land from the district. 160 
The dec i sion to grant or reject such a petition rests with the directors, 
the best interest of the district being their cr ite rion . 161 Similar 
procedures govern the inclusion of lands no t within boundaries of the 
districts. 162 
Evaluation of the irrigation district 
For the most part irriga tion districts have no t been successful in 
Utah. In addition, there is little likelihood that they will play much 
of a role in the fu t ure, since any additional wa t er development wi ll 
probabl y take place under one of the more popular ins titut ions already in 
opera tion. Nevertheless an attempt will be made t o evaluate the potentia l 
efficiency o f an irrigation district as they are provided fo r by law. 
Pro bably the most advantageous characteristic of an irrigation dis-
trict is that it makes possib l e a cooperat ive effort to de velop land and 
water within a common area. The boundaries of a di s trict may follow the 
count y l ines or any part thereof , but would generally be large enough to 
i nc lud e al l land with i n an area depending on a common wa t er sour ce. 
This would reduce duplication of effort and f acilities that have con-
tinually resulted when individuals or mu tual water companies have de-
veloped water for irrigation. 
The Act makes an attempt t o establish f l exibilit y within a district 
by providing that a wate r user c an assign the whol e or part of his water 
160rbid.' 73 - 7- 39. 
161Ibid .' 73-7-42. 
162
rbid ., 73-7-29, 73 - 7- 34. 
to another us er . This would he lp to establish a market within a dis-
trict since the user being able t o utilize wa t er to its greates t pro-
duct i vity wo uld be able to bid the resource away from other use r s . 
Th i s appare nt flexib ility is restri c t e d somewhat, however, by a require-
ment that all such transactions must be approved by the board of direc -
tors. Whether or not this pr oved to be a serious barrier t o f l exibility 
would depend on the a ttitudes of the wa t er us ers within the district since 
they e l ect the board of direc t ors and actually se t s uch policies. 
The security of tenure granted a water user is somewhat insecure be-
cause of the power granted the board of directors to reduce any land 
owner ' s water allotment. It is not likely, however, that the directors 
would do this, except propor tionately throughout the dis tric t to compen-
sate for a varying quantity of water in the system. Nevertheless, this 
power is ves t ed in the board of directors. 
Other uses within the district and all uses without have no security 
beyond a f ive yea r contract. In addition there are no provisions for 
compensation t o cover investment if contract s are not renewe d. This 
cou l d r esult in substantial underinvestment in ditche s and o ther wa t er 
works facilities necessary to achieve maximum productivity from th e wa t e r 
s uppl y. 
Even though this is a barrier to efficiency, the s ituati on i s much 
improved ove r earlier l eg i s lation . The initial l egis lation providing 
for irrigation districts prohibits them from l easing or r enting water to 
any use or user ou t s ide the district or any use o ther than agriculture 
wi thin the dis trict for a period of time greater than one year. In 
addit i on, the fee charged mus t be one and on e - hal f times that ass essed 
against wate r us ers within the district. 163 Irrigation district legis-
lation, at l eas t in this instance would satisfy Wantrup's c r i t erion that 
the important point in resource allocation is movement toward a more 
eff icient a llocation . 
Another admirable feature of the irrigation district is that making 
voting rights a function of water used. Since the purpose of a district 
is water development, this gives each landowner a say in the district 
activi ties proportionate t o the amount of his wa t e r allotment, one vote 
per acre-foot of water . 
Assessments are a l so t o be made in a like manner. The board of 
directors must dec ide each year how much money is necessary to retire the 
debt, pay the interest, and cover o ther maintenance and opera tion costs. 
This amount is l ev ied equa lly aga inst each ac r e - foo t of wa t e r supplied. 
This policy could result in maximum efficiency if the consumer (farmer) 
were all owed t o push consumption to the point where marginal revenue 
equa ls marginal cost (price) . Since the maximum amount of wa ter the con-
s umer can use depends on the maximum allo tment decreed by the State Enginee r 
and the sub sequen t allotmen t of the board of directors, the potential for 
a more effic i ent allocation of water is greatly impaired. 
The i r riga tion di st rict has bo th strong and weak point s when com-
paring it to other institutions employed in deve l oping and allocating 
water f or agricultural use . It has, however, had little effect on the 
water policy of the stat e . It would seem that the farmers have not been 
willing t o bind themse l ves so thoroughly t o the dictates of a three-man 
163Thomas , The Devel opmen t of Institutions Under Irrigation, pp. 
128-129. 
board as they have historically favored the smaller mutual company . 
Al so the security offered by an irrigation district has generally been 
insu ff icient to create a very good market for their bonds. 
The Municipal Water De partment 
Responsibilities of municipal 
water departments 
For the most part each city, town or village in the state attemp t s 
to supply its residents with an adequate quantity and quality of water 
for domestic needs. This responsibility is generally vested in a depart-
ment of water supply, an agency of th e municipa l government. 
The municipal water department is most often headed by the city 
engineer who has primary responsibility for maintaining the physical 
plant; i.e., pipe lines, storage reservoir, meters, and treatment 
plant. 164 There is general l y a crew of engineers and common laborers, 
depending on the size of the department and the type of water works, 
employed t o maintain and operate the system. 
Policy matters associated with deve loping additional supplies and 
allocating water among users, is the responsibility of the mayor and city 
council. Depending on the size of the town, an administrator may be 
hired to manage the water department, or one councilman may be given that 
s pecific responsibility. Some cities in Utah employ a city manager, who 
would be responsible for administering the water department as well as 
other departments of city government. He may be given authority to emp l oy 
164Hirshleifer, Water Supply, p. 176. 
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whatever system of alloca tion he feels will be most efficien t, but final 
responsibility res t s with the e l ected city officia l s . 
Of the many sources of water which are utilized by Utah ci ties , by 
far the most extens i ve are the wa t ers f r om mo unta in streams . The ear l y 
settlements in Utah were generall y situated near the mouth of a canyon s o 
the h igh quality stream wa t er could be ut il ized for domes tic use before 
flowing on t o o ther uses. 165 Since water rights accrue to those em ploy-
ing wa t e r beneficially , stream wa t er comprises at least part of the wate r 
supply of most Utah municipalities. 
Springs and artesian wells are of t e n sou rces of municipal water. 
Dee p wel l s, f r om which water i s pumped from underground aquifers, ar e 
being increas ingly utilized, especia lly a long the Wasatch Front . 166 
As demands have increas ed relative to the suppl y of wate r f rom 
mountain streams, steps have been take n t o utilize lower quali t y water 
from whatever source is possib l e . Water treatment makes th e sour ce 
safe, but also increases the burdens on municipal wate r departme nt s . 
Water for domestic use must exceed spec ifi c minimum standards, set 
by the State Department of Public Health. These s tandard s have become 
incre asingly important as population and industrial growth have expanded 
bo th the demand for wate r and the possibilities of pollution . At pr esent 
the state r e quires that the dt sso lved solids in the water not exceed 500 
mill igrams per litter (mg/ 1). 
165Hut chins, Mutual Irrigation Companies, p . 23. 
166
rnterview "i th Winegar . 
87 
To achieve this minimum standard , many municipal water departments 
maintain some type of treatme nt plant. These range from simple chlorina-
tion to a complex system of sedimentation, coagulati on, filtration, 
aeration, softening, and disinfection. 167 Although most domestic water 
passes through some treatment , a few water supplies are sufficiently 
pure to meet standards without. 
Allocating the water resource 
For the most part, the allocation process employed by municipal 
water departments fo llows quite c l ose l y the typical allocating system 
used in our society for other consump t ion commod ities in the market. 
Anyone in the system is entitled to use whatever amount of water he 
wants, at the established price. The effic iency of this allocation 
system depends primarily on the pricing mechan i sm employed and whether 
or not quantity is determinabl e. 
Basically all munic ipaliti es in the state 168 use e ither a fixed 
surcharge o r a block sys t em to price domestic water. 169 Generally, when 
water is not metered a fixed s urcharge sys tem is used. With this system 
a set price is charged each customer regardless of the quantity used. 
Sometimes the size of the payment is a func tion of the water using facili -
ties in the home . The significant point is that only one price is charged 
167 
Hirshleifer, Water Supply, p. 176. 
168At least those along the Wasatch Front and it is assumed others 
in the state will not differ substantially. 
169B. Delworth Gardner and Seth H. Schick, Factors Affecting Consump-
tion of Household Water in Northern Utah, Utah Agricultural Experiment 
Station Bulletin 449, November, 1964, p. 6. 
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each customer; the price does not va r y wi th the quantity used. 170 
The "block 11 or "multiple price" sys t em requires that water be 
metered to each household, the c ustomer being charged only for that quan-
tity he uses. Generally a minimum surcharge is made to cover consump -
tion up to a certain l eve l with successive blocks of water above that 
minimum being sub j ect to a schedule of prices, referred to as "block" 
or 11marginal" prices. 171 Some times these marginal prices are the same 
for each successive block of water, but generally they diminish as the 
quantity of water increases . 172 
Evaluation of the municipal 
water department 
The pricing policies of the municipal water departments 173 could 
be their greatest claim to efficiency. Unfortunately, this is not the 
case. The me thod of employing a fixed surcharge invites inefficient 
allocation of water. An unmetered customer will use water until its 
marginal va lue is zero, corresponding to its zero marginal cost . This 
is wasteful because th e water department cannot provide th e commodity 
at zero cost, and society will lose the difference between cost of de-
livery and the value in the use of excess units of wa ter consumed. 
170Ibid. 
l?llbid. 
172Ibid., p. 7. 
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several of the institutions already discussed r etail some water 
to households and employ the above mentioned pricing policies . However, 
there has been no discussion of this problem in preceding sections. This 
discussion will apply to all such institutions . 
This method could be justified if the system were so small (and 
supply so abundant) that increased savings from more efficient utiliza-
tion of the water were less than the cost of metering equipment neces-
sary to determine quantities used. However, it seems that the system 
would need to be very small with little prospect for growth, and that 
the water has no economical alternative use to justify such inefficiency. 
Most municipalities in Utah that emp loy marginal pricing, charge 
diminishing marginal prices on sucCessive blocks of water us ed. When 
diminishing block pricing is used the consumer will equate marginal 
value to marginal cost. Such a system would not reduce efficiency if 
there were only one us er in the system or all users consumed water in 
equal quantities. This situation would seldom occur. When consumers 
use quantities in differ ent blocks they pay different prices on marginal 
units, violating the criterion of equimarginal allocation and thus 
reduce eff iciency. 
An argument sometimes made in defense of this policy is that 
reduced prices for larger quantities of water will encourage heavier 
use in the watering of lawns, building water fountains, and other 
community beautifying endeavors. Those who pose this argument feel the 
loss in eff iciency is offset by increased value of property and community 
esteme. The re is little doubt that diminishing block pricing does ex-
pand consumption, but neverth e less, is inefficient because of the reasons 
already discussed. 
Optimum economic efficiency can be achieved if only one marginal 
price i s set for all units of water consumed. Under such conditions the 
consumer will push consumption only to the point where the value of 
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marginal utility equals marg ina l cost (pr i ce). Since on l y one price 
faces all consumers, values of marginal utility are equal for all con-
sumers and no reallocation of water can increase the t o tal value of 
communi t y utility. There is a considerab l e opportunity to increase 
efficienc y by es tabli shing a constant water price, ope n to all water 
r etailing insti tuti ons of t he state, but primarily in the municipal 
water departments. Implementation of such a pol i cy, it would seem, 
would be r e lative l y simple . 174 
174
Hir sh l e i fer ' s Water Supply contains an excellent discussion of 
wa t er ra t es, pp. 87-113. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study has attempted to evaluate the water institutions within 
the state upon their own merits, as provided by legal foundation , 
statements of intended policy, and actual practice. Focus has been 
on barriers to economic effic iency within individual institutions. 
Li ttle has been said about the interp l ay and overlapping of all these 
institutions, collectively. While some of these institutions may be 
conducive to efficiency by themselves, when operating simultaneously 
together, the result may be extensively inefficient because of duplica-
tion of administrative structure and faci l ities, and possibly even con-
f licting ob jectives and practices. 
Duplication of Facilities 
The mutua l irrigation companies have al ready been discussed in this 
context . Intracompany transactions are rather f lexibl e whil e excessive 
barriers exis t for intercompany negotiations. Consolidation of many 
neighboring companies shou ld result in subs tantial increases in effi-
ciency, due to the following reasons: 
l. The area of transfer flexibility wou ld be expanded. 
2. Fewer and larger ditches would reduce water l osses due to see -
page and evaporation, land devoted to ditches would decline, and main-
tenance expenses would fall. 
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3. Larger companies could afford to employ more efficient, pro-
gressive management, and all company resources, human and capital , 
could be employed more intensively. 
4. Fear of litigation because of adversely affecting neighboring 
companies through transfer policies would be greatly reduced. 
The trend seems to be toward consolidation of companies, or at 
least, incorporation. A concerted effort should be made by state and 
local government officials and all interested private parties to exp l ore 
the possibilities for facilitating thi s movement. Perhaps a detailed 
study which pinpoints the effect of consolidation upon the individual 
income of each stockho lder would help to convince users of water of the 
desirability of such a move. 
Not only agricultural uses experience this type of inefficiency. 
Indeed, urban water allocation of t en furnishes examples of duplication 
of effort and facilities. However, the urban problem is generally one 
of different types of institutions attempting to accomplish the same 
purpose within a metropolitan area. 
The best example of duplication of facilities is Salt Lake County, 
but these arrangements may typify many other localities in the stat e as 
well. There is no intent here to ou tline specific recommendations t o 
correct s pecific problems in Salt Lake City. It is hoped, however, that 
this discussion will help point out some serious inefficiencies that 
are prevalent throughout the state that need t o be studied further, 
and may guide, to some degree, future institutiona l deve lopment and/or 
reorganization. 
Within Salt Lake County there are three major water institutions 
that service urban users: (1) The Salt Lake City Water Department 
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deve lops, processes, and distributes water to residents of Salt Lake City 
and a few other users throughout the County who have been without a source 
of supply . ( 2) The Me tropolitan Water Dist rict wholesales water t o Salt 
Lake Cit y and several other users throughout the valley . This water is 
f i nished in a large ultra -modern treatment plant, built and operated by 
the distri c t. (3) The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy Di s tri ct 
supplies water to uses and users through the remainder of the Count y. 
They have deve l oped part of their supplies and pu r chase the r es t from 
the Metropo litan Water District. 
In addition to these , many municipalities thro ughout the county--
Sand y , Murray, Granger, Magna, etc. --mainta in wa t e r departments. Many 
of them develop and trea t the ir own water supplies and supp l ement those 
supp lies , when neces sar y, with wa t e r purchased from the Conservancy 
District or Me tropolitan Water Dis trict. 
Also, there are approximately 10 priva t e water companies in exis tenc e 
from ear l y days in the area southeas t of Salt Lake City . These are 
mutual companies furni s hing wa t er for domestic use t o stockho lders in a 
small ar ea . 
All in all ther e is a wide d i vers ity of institutions try ing t o 
deve l op and dis tribute wat er in Salt Lake Count y. It seems r eas onabl e to 
believe that inefficiency must r es ult from such a cong l omeration of 
ins titutions . Some possible reasons are: 
1 . Area of re spons ibility is of t e n sma ll limiting f r ee movement 
of water between all users in the metropolitan area. 
2. It is reasonable to believe that there would be economics of 
s ca l e in wa t er develo pment, treatment, and al l oca t ion . This might be 
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due to the fact that some physical plant is necessary to handle water 
and administer its distribution, each of which requires personnel and 
insures maintenance costs wh ich should decline as water quantity increases. 
In addition, specialized personnel can be hired for development, treat-
ment, and maintenance purposes if companies are large. 
The Ogden area has many of these same problems. For instance, 
Ogden City maintains water treatment plants. However, Since the creation 
of the Weber Basin Conservancy District, Ogden purchases a good share 
of their finished water from the District. Still at times of peak use, 
the city operates its treatment plant rather than purchase additional 
water from the District, but this means the plant is seldom used at full 
capacity. 
A recent study of water treatment costs conducted in California, 1 
concluded that unit construction costs decreased with increasing capacity 
between l and 300 acre fe et capacity . Also, operation and maintenance 
costs per unit processed decreased with incr eas ing flow capacity within 
the same range. 
In light of this study it is difficult to see why both treatment 
plants must be operated . Whatever the reason, efficiency would be in-
creased by a reduction of duplicate facilities. 
Generally, the problem of duplication is not so prevalent in smaller, 
less populated cities and towns. In these types of towns the respon-
sibilities for providing domestic water generally resides in only one 
1 
Gerald T. Orlab and Marvin R. Lindorf, '~ost of Water Treatment 
in California," J ournal of American Water Works Association, L (January, 
1958), pp. 45-55. 
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institution, the municipal water department. As was previously discussed, 
distribution of water by water departments is somewhat free from many 
of the inefficiencies experienced by other institutions. In some cases, 
cooperation with neighboring municipalities or other types of institu-
tions in developing and distributing water supplies may result in reduc-
tion of operating costs as we ll as the possibility of adverse third 
party effects. 
Institutional Development 
An overal l evaluation of the water institutional structure in Utah 
over time gives cause for optimism about the future of water allocation 
in the state. From the very beginning it seems that these institutions 
I 
have been used as vehicles for permitting greater trans fer flexibility. 
The mutual irrigation company provides irrigators the option of 
transferring wa t er within the company to th~ uses and points of use 
realizing the greatest marginal productivity of water. The municipal 
water department offers this same opportunity to domestic users. 
Growth and development of the state have considerably enhanced 
the des irability of increased transfer f l exibi lities, and have put new 
demands on the wate r allocating institutions. It is just as important 
now that water be able to move free ly to uses or users across the valley 
as it used to be for a farme r to rent water to his neighbor. To facili-
tate thes e types of trans fers, institutions such as the metropolitan and 
conservancy districts have been es tabli shed. These institutions traverse 
city and even county lines to add considerable flexibility to the system. 
It is true that some of these institutions are less likely to be 
eff icient than others . Also, establishment of new institutions has often 
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not resulted in abandonment of older, less efficient ones. This has 
resulted in much of the duplication already discussed. But the water 
users in the state have been continually attempting to achieve greater 
flexibility and resulting efficiency by es tablishment of new institutions. 
Indeed, it would seem that the answer to the states water allocation 
problems lies in the estab lishment of larger more effic i ent institutions. 
However, the primary fu nction of these larger institutions must be to 
create an atmosphere where in the free market will be, in so far as 
possible, relied upon to allocate the water resources . This is so be -
cause of the distinct advantages of free market allocation, some of 
which are summarized below. 
1 . Flexibility. Water users would be free to transfer water be-
tween users and uses at their discretion so that the value of the mar-
g inal product of water in all uses and among users wil l be equa l. Third 
party effec t s must not be over l ooked but the parties in question should 
be free to negotiate a transfer that is acceptable to all. 
2. Security. The proprietorship of a water right must be such 
that the owner will be able to determine final usage of the water. This 
will faci litate op timum investment in the water rights, use facilities, 
and management programs. If rights are sold in the market voluntarily, 
the market price constitutes compensation for one party giving up the 
right to another. 
3. Marginal pricing. It is important for optima l allocation that 
the price of water be a function of the quantity used. Op timum eff iciency 
requires that one marginal price be set for all units of water consumed 
and that that price be equal to all users, insofar as the costs associa-
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ted with distribution are equal. In pushing consumption to the point 
where price equals value of marginal utility, all consumers will have 
equal va lues of margina l utility since they face equal prices. 1&•r 
The trend throughout the development of Utah's water resources has vT 
been toward increased flexibility and resulting economic efficiency . 
The role of institutions in this positive development has been consid -
erable. Every encouragement sh ould be given by the State Legislature, 
by the executive department of state government, by the judiciary, and 
by citizens alike for this trend toward efficiency to continue and even 
be accentuated. The entire economy of the state, and the well being of 
its people will thus be greatly enhanced. 
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